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PRPJTEDINTHEUNITEDSTATESOFAMERICA 
Preface 
This volume is the &st collection of essays from wmIdoia0, the monthly 
journal of opinion that is now entering its sixth year of publication by 
the Council on Religion and International Affairs. As these essays are 
concerned to develop various approaches to a common subject, namely, 
the moral implications of modem nuclear warfare, they reflect the larger 
purpose of ~~~Zdoiew,  which is to determine what ethical guides, derived 
from the body of religious insight that is frequently referred to as "the 
Judeo-Christian tradition," may be relevant to the problems of politics on 
an international level. The writers of these essays make no attempt to 
*solve" the problem of nuclear weapons. They do attempt to engage in 
a consideration of the role of the stateman as he faces this most crucial 
and agonizing question, and to evaluate alternatives of thought and ac- 
tion which are, in the words of one of the participants, "morally respon- 
sible and politically wise." 
This series was inaugurated in the December, 1958 issue of wmIdview 
and was concluded in the October, 1960 issue. Political scientists, the- 
ologians, military analysts and journalists-"realis t s" and "pacifists"- joined 
and extended the discussion. As no attempt was made to enforce the 
more formal rules of debate, some of the participants wrote in direct 
challenge or response to previous contributions, while others preferred 
to state an independent viewpoint. The remarks in the section entitled 
"Postscripts" were contributed especially for publication in this pamphlet 
and appear here for the first time. A paper delivered at Princeton by 
George F. Kennan (reprinted in this pamphlet) provided a practicing 
statesman's views on the relationship of policy and conscience and, as 
such, was swept into the course of the discussion in wmZduiew's pages. 
In a sense, the discussion remains open. It could not be otherwise. By 
publishing these arguments in the form they took, the directors of the 
Council on Religion and International AfFairs hope to indicate how a be- 
ginning can be made to a joint examination of this, the great moral issue 
of our age. For there has been a strange silence on the subject of morality 
and modem armaments in the United States. There has been a dangerous 
divorcs between the moralists and the makers of the policy. The debate 
over morality and nuclear weapons has raged in many European coun- 
tries-notably in Great Britain-but here there exists a widespread apathy 
which seems to result more from ignorance than from cynicism. The great 
majority of citizens, it seems, has no notion that any future war carries 
dangers that were undreamed of in any past war, and the government 
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has not been concerned to info~m them of this fact. Indeed, the discussion 
so far has often seemed rather academic, far removed from "the world 
where things really happen." 
Unfortunately, the discussion is not so removed, nor can it be finally 
terminated until some meeting between the twin demands of morality 
and survival is affected. 
Father John Courtney Murray is professor of dogmatic t h e o l ~  at
Woodstock College and editor of the quarterly Theological Studies. Dr. 
J u h  N. Hartt is Noah Porter professor of philosophical theology in the 
Yale Divinity School. Dr. Steven S. Schwarzschild is Rabbi of Temple 
Beth El in Lynn, Mass. Mr. John Cogley is a member of the executive 
st& of the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions. Mr. Walter 
Millis is the author of Arms and Men and co-author of A m  and the State. 
Mr. Stephen G. Cary is Secretary of the American Section of the American 
Friends Service Committee, Mr. Ernest W. Lefever is the author of 
Ethics and United States Foreign Policy and a lecturer in the School of 
International S e ~ c e ,  the American University. Dr. John C. Bennett is 
Dean of the Union Theological Seminary and the editor of Nuclear 
Weapons and the Conflict o f  Comdence. Dr. Paul Ramsey is chairman 
of the department of religion in Princeton University and the author of 
War and the Christian Comdence. Mr. Kenneth W. Thompson is a 
former member of the political science faculties at the University of 
Chicago and Northwestern University; he is now associated with the 
Rockefeller Foundation. 
I am grateful to these men for their interest in this project and for 




W&m C I Q y  
MORALITY AND MODERN WAR 
John Courtney Murray, S.J. 
RELIGION AND THE BOMB 
Julian N .  Hartt 
THEOLOGIANS AND THE BOMB 
Stmen S. Schwmchild 
A WORLD WITHOUT WAR 
John Cogley 
WAR AS A MORAL PROBLEM 
Walter Minis 
THE PACIFIST'S CHOICE 
Stephen G. C a y  
FACTS, CALCULATION AND POLITICAL ETHICS 
Ernest W .  Lefever 
ETHICS AND "CALCULATION" 
John C .  Bennett 
RIGHT AND WRONG CALCULATION 
Paul Rammy 
POSTSCRIPTS 
WAR AND THE ABSOLUTISTS 
Kenneth W. Thumpon 
APPENDIX 

MORALITY AND MODERN WAR 
John Courtney Murray, S.J. 
There are three distinct standpoints from which it is possible to launch 
a discussion of the problem of war in this strange and perilous age of 
ours that has yet to find its name. My initial assertion will be that it is 
a mistake to adapt any one of them exclusively and to carry the argu- 
ment on to its logical conclusion. If this is done, the argument will end 
in serious difficulties. 
First, one might begin by considering the possibilities of destruction 
and ruin, both physical and human, that are afforded by existent and 
projected developments in weapons technology. Here the essential fact 
is that there are no inherent limits to the measure of destruction and 
ruin that war might entail, whether by the use of nuclear arms or pos- 
sibly by the methods of bacteriological and chemical warfare. 
Carried to its logical conclusion an argument made exclusively from 
this standpoint leads toward the p i t ion  that war has become a moral 
absurdity, not to be justified in any circumstances. In its most respect- 
able form this position may be called relative Christian pa&sm. 
It does not assert that war is intrinsically evil simply because it is a 
use of force and violence and therefore a contravention of the Christian 
law of love promulgated in the Sermon on the Mount. This is the absw 
lute pacifism, the unqualified embrace of the principle of non-violence, 
that is more characteristic of certain Protestant sects. 
The relative pacihts are content to afhm that war has now become 
an evil that may no longer be justified, given the fact that no adequate 
justification can be offered for the ruinous &ects of today's weapons of 
war. Even this position is not to be squared with the public doctxine 
of the Catholic Church. 
Second, one might begin the argument by considering the present his- 
torical situation of humanity as dominated by the fact of Communism. 
The essential fact here is that Communism, as an ideology and as a 
power-system, constitutes the gravest possible menace to the moral and 
civihational values that form the basis of "the WestP understanding the 
The complete text of this essay has been published in Pam hlet form by the 
Council on Religion and International Affairs (formerly Tf e Church Peace 
Union) in cooperation with the Catholic Association for International Peace. 
term to designate, not a geographical entity but an order of temporal life 
that has been the product of valid human dynamisms tempered by the 
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spirit of the Gospel. 
Arguing from this standpoint alone one could well posit, in all logic, 
the present validity of the concept of the "holy war." Or m e  might come 
to some advocacy of "preventive" war or "pre-emptive" war. Or one 
might be led to assert that, since the adversary is completely unprinci- 
pled, and since our duty in face of him is success in the service of 
civilization itself, we must jettison the tradition of civilized warfare and 
be prepared to use any means that promises success. 
None of these conclusions is morally acceptable. 
Third, one might choose as a starting point the fact that today there 
exists a mode of international organization that is committed by its 
charter to the presewation of peace by pacific settlement of international 
disputes. One might then argue that the validity of war even as a legal 
institution has now vanished, with the passing of the hypothesis under 
which its legal validity was once defended, namely, the absence of a 
juridically organized international community. 
But this conclusion seems, at very best, too rapid, for several reasons. 
The United Nations is not, properly speaking, a juridical organization 
with adequate legal authority to govern in the international community. 
It is basically a power organization. And its decisions, like those rendered 
by war itself, are naively apt to sanction injustice as well as justice. 
It is not at all clear that the existence of the United Nations, as pres- 
ently constituted, definitely destroys the hypothesis on which the validity 
of war as a legal institution has traditionally been predicated. 
It is not at all clear that the United Nations, in its present stage of 
development, will be able to cope justly and effectively with the under- 
lying causes of international disputes today or with the particular situa- 
tions in which the basic conflict rises to the surface. 
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If therefore one adopts a single standpoint of argument, and adheres 
to it narrowly and exclusively, one will not find one's way to an integral 
and morally defensible position on the problem of war. On the other 
hand, all of the three standpoints mentioned do derive from real aspects 
of the problem itself. In consequence, each of them must be exploited, 
if the problem is to be understood in its full scope. 
This is my second assertion. It is not possible here to develop it in 
detail. I shall merely suggest that there are three basic questions that 
must be explored at length and in detail. Moreover, there is an order 
among these qu&tions. 
The first question concerns the exact nature of the conflict that is the 
very definition of international life today. This is the first question be- 
cause it sets the perspectives in which all other questions must be con- 
sidered. 
I would note here that Pius XII, in contrast with some other Catholic 
theorists, has fairly steadily oonsidered the problem of war and af the 
weapons of war, as well as the problem of international organization, 
within the peaspectves of what he called "the line of rupture which 
divides the entire international community into opposed blocks," with 
the result that "coexistence in truthn is not possible, since there is no 
common acceptance of a "norm recognized by all as morally obligatory 
and therefore inviolable." 
I would further note that the exact nature of the international conflict 
is not easily and simply dehed. The line of rupture is not in the first 
instance geographic but spiritual and moral, and it runs through the 
West as well as between East and West. 
It cannot be a question of locating on 'bur" side of the rupture those 
wbo are virtuous and intelligent, and, over against ''us," those who are 
evil and morally blind. In contrast, it cannot be a question, as with cer- 
tain neo-Lutheran theorists, of maintaining that both East and West are 
so full of moral ambiguities that the line of rupture between them either 
does not exist or is impossible to discern. 
In a word, one must avoid both a moral simplism and a moral nibilism 
in the analysis of the intemational conflict. 
Finally, it is most important to distinguish, with Dr. William H. 
Roberts, between the mainsprings of the conflict and its concrete mani- 
festations; or, with Sir David Kelly, between the relatively superficial 
facts of change in our revolutionary world and the underlying currents 
of change. Moreover, it is important to relate the two levels of analysis, 
in so far as this can be done without artificiality. 
The tendmcy of this whole line of analysis will be to furnish a full 
answer to a complex of questions that must be answered before it is 
possible to consider the more narrow problem of war. 
What precisely are the values, in what hierarchical scale, that today 
are at stake in the international codict? What is the degree of danger 
in which they stand? 
What is the mode of the menace itself-in particular, to what extent is 
it military, and to what extent is it posed by forms of force that are more 
subtle? 
If these questions are not carefully answered, one will have no stand- 
ard against which to match the evils of war. And terror, rather than 
reason, will command one's judgments on the military problem. 
This is the danger to which the seven moral theologians in Germany 
pointed in thdr statanent of May 5,1958: "A part of the confusion among 
our people has its source in the fact that there is an insufficient realiza- 
tion of the reach of values that are endangered today, and of the hier- 
archical order among them, and of the degree of danger in which they 
stand On the other hand, from the Unheimkhkit of the technical prob- 
lems (of war itself) &ere results a crippling of intelligence and of will." 
The second basic question concerns the means that are available for 
insuring the defense of the values &at are at stake in the international 
confiict. This too is a large and complex question. 
A whole array of means is available, in correspondence with the multi- 
faceted character of the conflict itself. It is a matter of understanding 
both the usefulness and the limitations of each of them, from spectacular 
"summit meetings" across the gamut to the wholly unspectacular work, 
say, of agricultural experts engaged in increasing the food supply of so- 
called underdeveloped nations. 
This whole complex question must be fully explored antecedently to 
the consideration of the problem of war. The basic reason is that other- 
wise one can give no concrete meaning to the concept of war as ulthna 
ratto* 
Moreover, the value of the use of force, even as ultima ratio, will be 
either overestimated or underestimated, in proportion as too much or 
too little value is attached to other means of sustaining and pressing the 
international conflict. 
The third and final question concerns the uItima ratio itself, the ar- 
bitrament of arms as the last resort. 
Here we confront the third uniqueness in the total @em. The his- 
torical situation of international conflict is unique: "Never," said Pius XII, 
"has hunan history known a more gigantic disorder." The uniqueness of 
the disorder resides, I take it, in the unparalleled depth of its vertical 
dimdon., it goes to the very roots of order and disorder in the world- 
the nature of man, his destiny, and the meaning of human history. There 
is a uniqueness too in the second basic question posited above, sc., the 
u n p d e n t e d  scope of the c d c t  in its horizontal dimension, given the 
variety ot means whereby it may be, and is being, waged. 
A special uniqueness resides too in the existence of the United Nations, 
as an arena of conflict, indeed, but also as an instrument of peacemaking 
to some degree. 
However, the most immediate striking uniqueness comes to view when 
one considers the weapons for war-making that are now in hand or within 
P P *  
There are two subordinate questions under this general heading of the 
nature af war today* 
The b t  concerns the actual state of progress (if it be progress and 
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not a regress to barbarism) in the technology oE defensive and offensive 
weapons of war. The second concerns the military u s ~ e s s ,  for any 
intelligible military and political purposes, of the variety of weapons 
developed; this latter question therefore raises the issue of the strategic 
and tactical concepts that are to govern the use of these various weapons. 
The facts that would furnish answers to these questions are to a con- 
siderable extent hidden from the public knowledge; and, to the extent 
to which they are known, they have been generative of confusion in the 
public mind. In any case, these questions must have some reasonably 
satisfactory answer, if the maal problem of war is to be sensibly dis- 
cussed. 
Here then are three preliminary lines of inquiry to be pursued before 
the moral issues involved in warfare today can be dealt with, even in 
their generality. I hasten on to my third assertion, sc., that an initial, not 
necessarily complete, exploration of these three lines is sufficient to sug- 
gest the outlines of a general moral theory. 
Whether Catholic thought can be content to stop with a moral theory 
cast simply in the mode of abstractness that characterizes the following 
propositions will be a further question. In any case, it is necessary in the 
first instance to state the general propositions. 
(1) All wars of aggression, whether just or unjust, fall under the ban 
of moral proscription. 
The use of force (and presumably one would include the threat of 
force) is not a moral means for the redress of violated legal rights. The 
justness of the cause is irrelevant; there simply is no longer a right of 
self-redress; no individual State may presume to take even the cause of 
justice into its own hands. Whatever the grievance of the State may be, 
and however objectionable it may find the status quo, warfare is an im- 
moral means for settling the grievance and for altering existent mdi- 
tions. 
(2) A defensive war against unjust aggression is morally admissible 
both in principle and in fact. 
In its abstractness this principle has always formed part of Catholic 
doctrine; by its assertion the Church finds a sure way between the false 
extremes of pacifism and bellicism. Moreover, the assertion itself, far 
from being a contradiction of the basic Christian will to peace, is the 
strongest possible armation of this will. 
These are statements of the principles of the traditional doctrine on 
war. It is not dif6cult to state them. The difEculty be@ after the state- 
ment has been made. What is questioned today is the usefulness of the 
doctrine, its relevance to the concrete actualities of our historical moment. 
I think that the tendency to question the uses of the Catholic doctrine 
on war initially rises from the fact that it has for so long not been used, 
even by Catholics. That is, it has not been made the basis for a sound 
critique of public policies and a means f a  the formation of right public 
opinion. #-a The classic example, of awse, was the policy of U~mdi t iona l  sur- 
render'' during the last war. This policy clearly violated the requirement 
of the "right intentionn that has always been a princip1e in the traditional 
doctrine of war. Yet no sustained criticism was made of the policy by 
Catholio publicists or even by Catholic bishops. 
Nor was any substantial &ort made to clarify by moral judgments the 
thickening mood'of savage violence that made possible the atrocities of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki. 
I think it is true to say that the traditional doctrine was irrelevant 
during World War 11. This is no argument against the traditional doc- 
trine. The Ten Cammandmeats do not lose their imperative relevance 
by reason of the fact that thqr are violated. But &ere is place for an 
indictmeat of all of us who failed to make the tradition relevant. 
The initial relevance of the traditional doctrine today lies in its value 
as the solvent of false dilemmas. Ow fragmentized d t u r e  seems to be 
the native soil of this fallacious and dangerous type of thinking. 
T h e  are, first of dl, the two extreme positions, a softly seatimental ' 
pacifism and a cynically hard realism. Both of these views which are also i 
"feelings" are formative factors in the moral climate of the moment. Both , 
of thw are condemned by the traditional doctrine of the Church as false 
and ~ C Y U S .  
The pb lem is to refute by argument the false antinomy between war ' 
and morality that they assert in common, though in digerent ways. The ' 
b&%tr and more d8icult problem is to punfy the. public climate of the . 
dmma that emanates from each of them and tends to smother the public 
conscience. 
The second false diltmma has threatened to dominate the argument . 
on national defense in Germany. It sloganized itself thus: *Lbber rot ah 
tot.* It has made the same threat in England whae it has been developed 
in a symposium by 23 distinguished Englishmen entitled The Fearful 
Choke: A Deb- on Nuclear Policy. 
The choice, of course, is between the desperate alternatives, either mi- 
versa1 atomic death or complete surrender to C-unism. The C a W c  
mind, schooled in the traditional doctrine of war and peace, rejects the , 
dangerous fallacy hvolved in this casting up of desperate alternatives. , 
Hidden beneath the fallacy is an abdication of the moral reason and a , 
craven submission to some manner of techn010gical or historical deter- 
*, 
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It is not, of course, that the traditional doctrine rejects the extreme 
alternatives as possibilities. Anything in history is possible. Moreover, on 
grounds of the moral principle of proportion the doctrine supports the 
grave recommendation of the greatest theorist of war in modern times, 
von Klausewitz: "We must therefore familiarize ourselves with the 
thought of an honorable defeat." 
Conversely, the doctrine condemns the hysteria that swept Washing- 
ton in 1958 when the Senate voted 82 to 2 to deny government funds 
to any person or institution who ever proposes or actually conducts any 
study regarding the "surrender of the govemment of the U.S." 
"Losing," said von Klausewitz, "is a function of winning," thus stating 
in his own military idiom the moral calculus prescribed by traditional 
moral doctrine. The moralist agrees with the military theorist that the 
essence of a military situation is uncertainty. And when he requires, with 
Pius XII, a solid probability of success as a moral ground for a legitimate 
use of arms, he must reckon with the possibility of failure and be pre- 
pared to accept it. 
But this is a moral decision, worthy of a man and of a civilized nation. 
It is a free and responsible act, and therefore it inflicts no stigma of dis- 
honor, 
It is not that "weary resignation," condemned by Pius XI1 (Christmas 
Message, 1948), which is basic to the inner attitude of the theorists of 
the desperate alternatives, no matter which one they argue for or accept. 
On the contrary, the single inner attitude which is nourished by the tra- 
ditional doctrine is a will to peace, which, in the extremity, bears within 
itself a will to enforce the precept of peace by arms. 
But this will to arms is a moral will, controlled by reason; for it is 
identically a will to justice. It is formed under the judgment of reason. 
And the first possibility contemplated by reason, as it forms the will to 
justice through the use of force, is not the possibility of surrender, which 
ww~ld mean the victory of injustice. This is the ultimate extremity, be- 
yond even the extremity of war itself. 
Similarly, the alternate possibility considered by reason is not a gen- 
eral annihilation, even of the enemy. This would be worse than injustice; 
it would be sheer folly. In a word, a debate on nuclear policy that is 
guided by the traditional doctrine of war does not move between the 
alternatives of surrender or annihilation. 
If it means simply an honorable defeat, surrender may be morally 
tolerable; but it is not to be tolerated save on reasonable calculus of 
proportionate moral costs. In contrast, annihilation is on every count 
morally intolerable; it is to be averted at all costs, that is, at the cost of 
every effort, in every field, that the spirit of men can put forth. 
Precisely here the paoximate and practical value, use, and relevance of 
the traditional doctrine begin to appear. FE 
Its remote value lies in its service as a standard of casuistry on various 
kinds of war and in its general formation of the private and public con- 
science and of the climate of moral opinion in the midst of today's inter- 
national d c t .  But its proximate value is felt at the crucial point where 
the moral and political orders meet. 
Rimarily, its value resides in its capacity to set the right terms for 
rational debate on public policies bearing on the problem of war and 
pea= in this age, characterized by international d c t  and by advanced 
technology. This is no mean value, if you consider the damage that is 
being presently done by argument carried on in the wmng terms. 
The traditional doctrine disqualifies as irrelevant and dangerous the 
false dilemmas of which I have spoken. It also rejects the noticm that 
the immediate problem is to "abolish war" or "ban the bomb." 
It is true that the traditional doctrine looks forward to its own dis- 
appearance as a chapter in Catholic moral theology. The efEort of the 
moral ream to fit the use of violence into the objective order of justice 
is paradoxical enough; but the paradox is heightened when this effort 
takes place at the interior of the Christian religion of love. 
In any case, the prindples of the doctr&e themselves make clear that 
our historical moment is not destined to see the doctrine discarded as 
unnecessary. War is still the possibility, not to be exorcised by prayer 
and fasting. The ' Church does not look immediately to the abolition of 
war. Her dodrihe still seeks to Wll its triple traditional function: to 
condemn war as evil, to limit the evils it entails, and to humanize its 
wnduct as far as possible. 
In the light of the traditional doctrine and the no less necessary light 
of the facts of international life and technological development today, 
what are the right terms for argument on public policy? T h m  are readily 
reached. 
The doctrine asserts, in principle and in fact, that force is still the 
uMma rutlo in human affairs, and that its use in extreme circumstances 
may be m;ora& obligatory ad repeUandum injurium. The facts assert 
that today this ult6M rutw takes the fonn of nuclear force. 
The doctrine asserts that an unlimited use of nuclear force is immoral. 
The facts assert that nevertheless the use of nuclear force remains pos- 
sible and may prove to be necessary, lest a free field be granted to brutal 
violence and lack of conscience. 
The doctrine cloncludes that the use of nuclear force must be limited, 
the principle of limitation being the exigencies of legitimate defense 
against injustice. Thus the terms of public debate are set in two words, 
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%ted war." All other terms of argument are either fanciful or fallacious. 
I shall not attempt to construct the debate itself. But two points may 
be made. 
First, there are those who say that the limitation of nuclear war, or 
any war, is today impossible, for a variety of reasons-technical, political, 
etc. In the face of this position, the traditional doctrine simply asserts 
again, "the problem today is limited war." 
But notice that the assertion is on a higher plane than that of sheer 
fact. It is a moral proposition, or better, a moral imperative. In other 
words, s i .  nuclear war may be a necessity, it must be made a possibil- 
ity. Its possibility must be created. 
And the creation of its possibility requires a work of intelligence, and 
the development of manifold action, on a whole series of levels-political 
(foreign and domestic), diplomatic, military, technological, scientific, 
fiscal, etc., with the important inclusion of the levels of public opinion 
and popular education. To say that the possibility cannot be created by 
intelligence and energy, under the direction of a moral imperative, is to 
succumb to some sort of determinism in human &airs. 
My second point is that the problem of limited war would seem to 
require solution in two stages. 
One stage cunsists in the construction of a sort of 'inoilel" of the lim- 
ited war. It is largely a problem in conceptual analysis. Its value consists 
in making clear the requirements of limited war in terms of policy on 
various levels. Notably it makes clear, for instance, that the limitation 
of war becomes difEcult or impossible if fiscal policy assumes the primacy 
over military policy. 
The second stage is even more difEcult. It centers on a quaestio f a d .  
The fact is that the international conflict, in its ideological as in its 
p e r  dimension, comes to concrete expression in certain localized situa- 
tions, each of which has its own peculiarities. The question then is, where 
and under what circumstances is the eruption of violence possible or 
likely, and how is the limitation of the conflict to be effected in these cir- 
cums tances? 
The answer to this question is precisely what is meant by the forma- 
tion of policy. Policy is the hand of reason set firmly upon events. Policy 
is what you do in this given situation. In the concreteness of policy there- 
fore the assertion of the possibility of limited war is finally made, and 
made good. 
Policy is the meeting-place of the world of power and the world of 
morality, in which there takes place the concrete reconciliation of the 
duty of success that rests upon the statesmen and the duty of justice that 
rests upon the civilized nation that he serves. 
I am thus led to one final comment on the problem of war. It may be 
that the classical doctrine of war needs more theoretical elaboration in 
order to relate it more eflectively to the unique conflict that agitates the 
world today, in contrast with the older historical conflicts upon which 
the traditional doctrine sought to bear, and by which it in turn was 
shaped. 
In any case, another work of the reflective intelligence is even more 
badly needed. I shall call it a politico-moral analysis of the divergent and 
particular conflict-situations that have arisen or are likely to arise in the 
international scene as problems in themselves and as manifestations of 
the underlying crisis of our times. It is in these particular situations that 
war actually becomes a problem. It is in the midst of their dense ma- 
teriality that the quaestio iuris finally rises. 
To answer it is the function of the moralist, the professional or the 
citizen moralist. This answer will never be more than an act of pru- 
dence, a practical judgment informed by principle. But he can give no 
answer at all to the quaestio iutis until the quaestw fad has been 
answered. 
From the point of view of the problem of war and morality the same 
need appears that has been described elsewhere in what concerns the 
more general problem of politics and morality. I mean the need of a far 
more vigorous cultivation of politico-moral science. 
RELIGION AND THE BOMB 
Julian N. Hartt 
In his essay, "Morality and Modem War," John Courtney Murray anato- 
mized several of the central elements of the problem-and he did it in his 
characteristically clear and coolheaded way. Beyond this, he argued that 
there is a sane middle ground between the extremes of pacifism and bel- 
licism, and that the health of the nations demands that they oocupy this 
middle ground. 
I have no inclination to part company with Father Murray7s judicious- 
ness and perceptiveness, in order to tr&c either with sentimentalists or 
with cynics, with those who piously believe that love can dispense with 
force or with those who mrnfully believe that love, and even justice, 
merely complicate the efficient and decisive use of force in pursuit of 
national self-interest. Aoco~dingly the questions which I raise here re- 
flect, I hope, great sympathy for the stabilizing and moderating claims of 
reawn, whose voice is t w  seldom and too impatiently heard in the land 
in our troubled times. 
Where is the salvatory and salubrious middle ground, and what is the 
access to it? Abstractly, it is plotted between pacifism and bellicism; be- 
tween life-at-any-price and let's-get-it-over-with; between total war and 
no war; between unlimited nuclear weaponry development and aboliticm 
of all such weaponry. The name for this position is "limited war"; and it 
is understood that the limits placed upon warfare are imposed by con- 
science and are enforced by some adequately powerful organization. 
So far so good. The problem is how to take and to hold the middle 
ground for the purposes of policy-formation and policy-enactment. What 
is forthcoming to instruct the wnsciences of those who must make policy 
and those for whom it is made and enacted and who must endure its haz- 
ards and its hardships? 
Father Murray is wholly right in waming us that conscience is not 
properly instructed by fear and anxiety. Fear and anxiety are very potent 
forces, and they vehemently assail the contemporary mind when it is en- 
gaged with the harrowing problems of war and survival. They must 
therefore be rigorously disciplined so that the mind can be adequately 
empowered and directed by the apprehension of the real good. True. But 
the truth tempts us to sell short a fact or two, such as the very deep fear 
that the family of nations is a wolf-pack rather than a human community; 
and the fear of having lost sight, and every other sense, of the real good. 
Such facts forcibly remind us that efficacious instruction of conscience 
presupposes a stable community with unquestioned adhereace to ultimate 
ethical principles. In the absence of this community the making and the 
executing of policy effecting the public welfare is bound to be arbitrary, 
if not capricious; and is therefore bound to use sub-rational appeals and 
warrants for its approval. 
Then does this cummunity longer exist, this s-ethical presupposition 
of policy? Does it survive as a treasured myth and as a moral relic of its 
oncs unquestioned principles left in vastly attenuated force as merely 
expediential counsel? I 
I do not propose these questions as (merely) rhetorical. Father Mur- 
ray has not, I believe, clearly enough come to terms with the question be-, 
hind every serious consideration of limited war as a moral option, i.e., 
where are the ethical  principle^ to fix the appropriate limits? Where, nut 
w h :  can we make out the I&-ents of the community which is the 
living repository (as it were) of the ethical principles relevant and ef- 
ficacious to the moral determination of the limits of warfare? 
There are two answers to such a question. One is to identify that so- 
ciety we call America as that community. Another is to elevate a religious 
community to the position of ethical monitor and tutor to the common- 
wealth as a whole. Let us briefly considers these as alternatives. 
"American is certainly a name for a generalized moral attitude, a fact 
which some home-grown prophets are frequently disposed to under-esti- 
mate. It is not, however, an attitude which is capable of illuminating 
and dir8cti.g conscience on the formidable question here under discus- 
sion. It requires for itself just such treatment in our time. And what is 
often proposed as that physician and mentor to the American ideal is the 
Tudeo-Chris tian tradition. 
.I 
The proposal is barely plausible. "American is a variant of a cultural 
synthesis; and Judaism and classical Christianity are mponents in that 
synthesis; and the mother which "birthed" America has no great power 
now to rebuke, chasten, and amend her child. The Judeo-Christian tra- 
dition is a memory, not a presently-efficacious conscience. As such it can 
occasion a residual guilt but hardly the shuddering awe which only the 
living God can strike into our hearts. 
So we consider the living religious communities honored in America 
as having every right to exist so far as none is pledged to the destruction 
of the state. Each of these has accommodated itself to the requirements 
of law and massive sentiment; but each has also persisted in standing out 
against the cultural synthesis, in a rich variety of ways, running from 
mild non-concurrence to militant dissidence upon grave occasion. And 
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here is the rub: policy in behalf of the public welfare can be qualified only 
marginally by any oommunity in the state unless that community, in this 
case a "Church," can ccmvince the massive sentimeat that the best in- 
terests of all will thus and not otherwise be served. Really to establish 
such a claim the spokesmen for the Church must presuppe an intuition 
of the good at the heart of the massive sentimeat, and peed u p  the 
assumption of the coincidence of that intuition and the ethical traditions 
of the Church. 
Here let us amsider what Father Murray calls tbe traditional teaching 
of the Christian Church on the morality of war. Unquestionably the tra- 
dition makes a solid junction at certain points with the massive senti- 
ment of modem culture in the West, and for the very good reason that 
both have a common ancestor in classical civilization. But there is also 
the Gospel. As a Christian I should 5 d  it quite literally incredible that 
the Gospel had not taught Western man something about justice which 
he could not oonceivably have laarned from Aristde; but at the same 
time I should have to profess that the Higher Righteousness in which 
Jesus Christ alone can instruct us is o p  and meaningful only to faith 
in Him. Jesus Christ comes not with a axle of precept and cmmsel but 
with the power d God unto forgiveness and ab lu te  transfosnation. 
Thus in the *world" of His creation justice itself takes on a meaning im- 
e b l e  to it okherwise. 
If this is so, what kind of criticism can the man of ChrLFtian faith make 
of the policies of the man of the world? The question is objecticmable if 
it assumes ideal types, objectionable because highly, if not hopelessly, 
abstract. But the question need not be so taken. (Indeed, nothing is to be 
gained save the poison-ivy wreath d self-righteousness by denying the 
confused mode in which even the most sublimely pious Christian appro- 
priates the Gospel.) We can in good faith make it the question whether 
the holy weight o# the Gospel does not come down on the objectives of 
policy more clearly and decisively than upon a presumptive identity 
of ethical presupposition uniting the statesman spaking and working 
for the massive sentimemt and the Christian churchman. 
The Gosml has a kind of life in the massive sentiment but it is the 
life of cul& appmpriaticm. This cultural appropriation has drained ofE 
the religious uniqueness of the Gospel in order to make the realization of 
the &pel imperatives a purely human possibility. And now the im- 
mense power over nature and  we^ man bestowed on human hands 
creates and richly nourishes the profound illusion of modernity, viz., 
that we have to render an account only to ourselves. For the time be- 
ing, vestigial guilt survives for having killed "God," but tomorrow will 
be a brighter, freer day: no God, no guilt* 
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Father Murray has rightly called attention to the profound and per- 
vasive moral disorder which embraces Western society. I find it neces- " 
sary to relate this spiritual sickness somewhat more directly to war than 
he has done in "Morality and Modem War." 
War is yet what it has been for a very long time in Western society, 
an integral aspect of this culture. However horrible its devastations, no 
one in a position of considerable power seriously proposes to eliminate 
it-and for a very compelling reason: elimination of war would strictly 
=tail elimination of certain attitudes .and values without which our life 
would assume an alien cast. It is a "right of naturen to aggrandize one- 
self at the cost of others, though convention dictates a certain softening, 
a certain glossing over of this "right" with the pale cast of sentimen- 
tality. 
Historically this "rightn has been more unequivocally imputed to na- 
tions than to persons, but not mare passionately. But on the other hand, 
and with equal passion, Western c u b e  in its modern mood has pro- 
fessed that against deliberate immsition of injustice bv one State u r n  
another, war% the finally au&tative r&se and k b s s  
But an important qualification obtrudes on the contemporary mind: 
unless the resort to force should be self-defeating. This reservation is a 
focus for great ambiguities and anxieties. Grant that the proximate ob- 
jective in fighting a war is to win. Now suppose either stalemate or an- 
nihilation is the only possible result, given present weapons (to 
nothing of weapons yet to come). Can a war on these terms then be 
j d e d  by appeal to remoter objectives, i.e., justice and national honor? 
Better to have fought and lost than to have endured supinely the 
gandizement of injustice: as h e  a slogan as one m d d  hope to hear, 
but what does it mean to people who do not believe that they live and 
must live in a moral cummunity transcending all national boundaries? 
What does it mean to people who believe that the values and d o r t s  
of the democratic West are the only God there is? Nothing is easier, in 
this state of mind, than to &e justice with self-interest, and honor 
with prestige, so thoroughly that their critical distinction becomes im- 
possible. 
A significant part of the moral disorder of the West is the fear of de- 
struction visited upon our way of life by "nuclear war." This fear has a 
religious quality so far as this way of Life is the only imperious God 
universally acknowledged. A very precarious and creaturely God it is, 
but it is therefore one whose swvival and welfare generate immense and ju 
morbid anxiety. And this state of mind seduces honest men into believing 
that their State ought not to fight unless it is directly attacked, and that ~4 
when they fight they are under no moral obligation to an actually ex- 
isting cmmtmd~ embracing all nations and all peoples. There is very 
little use in holding over their heads traditional moral values and obliga- 
tions, so long as they are unable or m a g  to acknowledge the meta- 
physical realities undergirding them. 
THEOLOGIANS L.-) THE -,... 
Steven S. Schwarzschild 
In sophisticated theological circles of all religious communions unquali- 
fied rejection of war is not even argued against anymore. It is just in- 
sulted. The word "pacifists" is apparently never used without the adjec- ' 
tive "sentimental," if not worse. 
The reasan far this attitude is a little dif6cult to understand. It would 
seen that there must be more deserving objects of swm than people who 
are so revolted by the shedding of human blood that, sometimes perhaps 
without lengthy casuistic cogitations, they raise their hands heavenward 
and swear to abstain from all forms of direct or indirect military action. 
Let it be granted that such people are unrealistic, utopian, emotional, 
and all the other faults which are ascribed to them by the hard-headed 
empiricists of religion. For the sake of the argument, let it be assumed 
that they are totally wrong and may cause a great deal of harm to the rela- 
tively good society which is to be safeguarded by war. Still, from the point 
of view of religion-which, it may be taken for granted, abhors war even 
when war is inevitable and necessary-surely in a world haunted by the i 
constant threat of nnnihilatinn there must be men and ideologies and in- t 
stitutions and impulses which more properly and greatly merit impreca- 
tions and refutations: namely, all those which tend to cause the reality 
and possibly also the necessity of organized killings. 
It is a quality of moral revulsim which one finds lacking in Father John ' 
Courtney Murray's "Morality and Modem War." Father Murray would, 
of course, pray and reason and exert himself for the prevention of war as 
much as any pacifist, but he is so preoccupied with his taxonomical en- 
deavors in the field at military morality and social catastrophes that in his 
writing one does not find any sense of what nuclear war really is. The 
ghastly vision of thousands of charred and disintegrated human bodies is 
effectively hidden behind elaborate ethical charts. And in his article "Re- 
ligion and the Bomb" (April 1959), Professor Julian Hartt shows that he 
does not like pacifists any better, even though he loses control of himself 
at one point to execrate war and denauncs those whose systems of values 
foster it. 
My wmments, to be sure, are pretty subjective. But on the subject of 
nuclear war a large dose of subjectivism is called for. In tbe first place, 
unless there be a demand for peace so violent that it will shake the 
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heavens and thrones of the mighty, the necessary i n t e l l d  and social 
efforts will not be undertaken to ensure peace. And let it not be said again, 
as is said nowadays invariably when this point in the discussion is reached, 
that the belief that peace can be ensured is in and of itself idolatmusly 
utopian: we are speaking not of the establishment of the Kingdom of God 
but only, and modestly, of preventing the outbreak of international atomic 
warfare. 
One must; in the second place, begin one's arguments on this subject 
with a personal reaction because one has the impression that the propo- 
nents of religious realism and of theological permissiveness in regard to 
rimited war" have heard all the logical arguments against their views and 
have not been persuaded, even as-contrary to the assumption often made 
-most widealists" have l i s t d  to and rationally concluded that they 
must reject the arguments of the realists. 
What good will it do to go through the whole roster of considerations 
once again? Surely Father Murray had previously heard Professor Hartt's 
question about who can be expected or trusted to defhe the limits of 
"limited war" and the specific application of the concepts of aggressive 
or defensive war. It may be   resumed that he has found an answer satis- 
factory to himself eithei in p'hi1050Phical terms or within the authority oE 
the Catholic Church. By the same token, it would not be too difBdt to go 
through Father Murray's tight conceptual development and, approach- 
ing it from another perspeciivc point out its inadequacies. This would 
do equally little good. He has unquestionably been confronted with all 
these issues before and has, at least for himself, overwme them. 
In other ways, the same probable ineffectiveness of argumentation 
looms up before Professor Hartt. It is not vey easy to understand his 
ultimate cuncern. This seems to be that if men do not possess loftier com- 
mitments than their own lives they will not be prepared to wage war for 
any but egotistical goals. But men must be reminded that their egotisti- 
cal goals will be destroyed by war and that loftier goals than egotistical 
ones are unattainable through war. And theologians must not ponder- 
ously cwer under their heavy academic blankets the straightfoward di- 
vine command to s andy  life, not to abandon it to the powers of human 
sinfulness. 
(One sometimes wonders whether our insistence on theological deepen- 
ing of religion and life is justified when one observes the contrast between 
theological subtlety and the uncomplicated, healthy human desire for dig- 
nified existence. Under such conditions an appeal to the anixnalic fear of 
pain and death and to the untrained, uncritical wish for personal security 
may be entirely warranted.) 
By the time Father Murray has run the course of his argument against 
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the "twin errors" of pacifism and militarism, the Chufch is 
business of justdjhg war than ever before in history. In the 
institutions have demanded that war be waged and 
was taking place, but now more is asked: nuclear war must be made a , 
possibility by, among other things, education under the direction of a! 
mural imperative and by the construction of model limited wars in terms h 
of-presumably theological-conceptual analysis. The next step might be' 
the formation of an Institute for the Theological Formulation of Atomic 
Military Strategy, known as ITFAMS. Such an Institute wodd be the 
logical reductio ad absurdum of most contemporary theologizing on the IN ! 
problem of war. 
The trouble with most of our thinking on this question is that we have 
looked at Mars through the wrong end of the telescope, and therefore . 1 
pacifists have shown up as small sentimental fools. We have assumed 
that human sinfulness is a given, determined quantity; that any attempt 
 
to reduce this quantity constitutes arrogance and self-idolization; and 
that, therefore, the practice of virtue must be fitted into the existing, un- 
changeable framework of sin. War, it is believed, is part of this permanent 
character of unredeemed human existence, and from this premise f o l h  
all these desperate and torturous endeavors to recode the realities of 
religion and war with one another. 
Turn the telescope around, and you lose none of the objects in the pic- 
ture: s i n  is not thereby optimistically and deceptively denied; the power 
of evil is not thereby denigrated; the real dangers which exist in the 
world are not overlooked; and the possibility of war is not thereby mag- 
ically blown away. But instead of positing sinfulness as a given, dog- 
matic, metaphysical reality to which we must submit, it is transformed 
into what &e~Philosophe& call a limiting concept. It comes at the end 
of goodness, when goodness m o t  go any further7 when goodness is 
frustrated-not before goodness has been tried, not a priori telling good- 
ness where and how far it can go. 
And if virtue could not clash the barrier of sin yesterday, then today it 
may succeed, for neither virtne nor sin is a given quantity; rather -are 
they dynamic realities which grow and wane, and thus the war that may 
have been unavoidable yesterday may be preventable today. Which of 
them is stronger at any given point in history can be determined, not by 
philosophic calculations or by theological statistics, but only by the grace 
of God and by man's moral strength. 
The distinction between offensive and defensive war is, of come, a 
very old one. Jewish law makes hother fundamental distinction between 
*&anded wars" and "permitted wars." Commanded wars are those 
which the Bible describes as divinely ordered, against the seven ab- I 
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original Palesthian peoples and. the Amalekites. But this very law also 
long ago "historicizedn this commandment, placed it in the closed chap- - ' I' 
ter of the past without any possible bearing on the present: these nations 
no longer exist, and therefore commanded wars are no longer conceivable. 
Just the same, even retroactively and against strong judicial opposition, 
Maimonides toned down the commandment of obligatory war by permit- 
ting it only if the enemy had explicitly refused to accept the duties of the 
minimal moral law encumbent upon all human beings. As for "permitted 
wars," that is, wars to be decided upon by human considerations, they 
may be entered into only with the permission of the great Sanh- 
of seventy-one members, and thus, at least for Jewish purposes, also this 
category of wars has become a mere memory since the Sanhedrin has in 
effect become unreconstitutable. 
*Limited wars" of which the tacticians and now also the theologians 
speak were the only ones which even in Biblical days were regarded as 
conceivable in the first place. Let anyone try to wage any kind of war 
h e  days and yet, taking the Bible seriously, adhere to the limitations 
there laid down-sparing all women and children, fruit trees and water 
springs, keeping one line of withdrawal open far the enemy by which 
he may save himself, exempting the newly married and those who have 
embarked on new constructive enterprises from military senice, and 
sending home all those who declare not that they have sauples against 
bearing arms but that they are afraid! Who is not afraid? Why, not only 
trees and streams, the very air we breathe is homicidally polluted even 
before we have begun the war! 
Religion may not be able to prevent war, although this is far from 
proved since it has never been tried, but it can in turn at least refuse to 
sanction it and thus establish standards toward which to strive. The 
minimum, however, that can be demanded from the theologians is that 
they cease belaboring the few pacifists and address themselves a little 
mole to the question of how far religion can make compromises with ex- 
isting conditions and still remain the hard command of God. 
A WORLD WITHOUT WAR 
John Cogley 
War ceased to be a logical enterprise when it passed beyond the simple 
dimensions of aggression and defense. There was indeed a perverse logic 
in the actions of those who took up arms in order to seize what did not 
belong to them-the logic of the criminal; and certainly there was a log- 
ical basis for the reaction of those attacked when they decided to meet 
force with force and refused to give up what was rightfully theirs. But 
as time went on and international politics became more complex, war 
began to be thought of as a way to decide which of two disputants had 
justice on his side. With that development, war lost its intrinsic logic, 
for war can never determine who is right; it can only determine who is 
stronger. Throughout history aggressors and scoundrels have walked ofE 
with war's victories, and even when the righteous have triumphed it has 
not been at all clear that they triumphed because they were righteous. 
The outcome of World War 11, for instance, did not prove that Hitler 
was wrong and the Allies right, no more than a Nazi victory would have 
proved the opposite. 
To say all this, however, is not to say that World War I1 was bereft of 
logic, because, like all idea-wars, once the fateful step was taken, the 
contest soon developed into an aggressor-and-defender war. Those who 
fought it do not, a decade and a half after it was brought to a close, feel 
that they acted irrationally. They tend, rather, to think of Nazism as an 
aggressive force that had to be stopped and see their role in the war not 
as armed ideologues meeting rival ideologues but as defenders of na- 
tional integrity, property and human life resisting by force those who 
were on a rampage of destruction. Even the ideological Russians put 
their dogma aside for the duration and inspired the Red troops with 
thoughts of Holy Russia and the sanctity of the homeland. And American 
troops, thousands of miles from home, were told unceasingly that if Hit- 
ler triumphed, Alcron and San Pedro, Brooklyn and Detroit would be in 
mortal danger. Moreover, they believed what they were told. They still do. 
And this general satisfaction that the U.S. did right to help win the 
second World War is one reason, I think, why contemporary pacifism has 
so little appeal for us. Despite the monstrous weapons of modem war, 
pacifism is less acceptable now than it was in the 1920's and '30$. I think 
this is due, in no little measure, to the fact that the very thought of a 
Hitler victory, all these years later, still suggests more horror than can be 
"'elicited by even the liveliest memory of the war's anguish. ' It is no love of violence, then, that keeps even religious men out of the nl. pacifist's camp; rather it is their recent experience with totalitarian evil 
and the conviction that, if gone unchecked, it could have resulted in even 
greater evil, in malice beyond our most perfervid imaginings, as indeed 
the sight of the piled-up bodies found in the concentration camps after 
the war exceeded the rhetoric of the most beIlicose orator. 
In a word, most of us are hopelessly convinced that pacifism provided 
no answers for our confrontation with the Nazi evil unleashed in Sep 
tember, 1939. We do not regret that we turned a deaf ear to the pacifist 
call then, and we have no greater confidence in its adequacy today. 
This is not to say, of course, that the pacifists might not have been right 
then or that the evil involved in the crushing of Nazism might not actually 
weigh more heavily on the moral scale than the evil an unchecked Nazism 
wouId have led to. But most of us are not convinced of this and believe 
that the world, for all its present woes, is still better off than it would be if 
Nazism had not been crushed. 
Even those of us who question pacifist theory, however, must now begin 
to think about pacifism-or at least must think about something that might 
easily be mistaken for pacifism though in truth it has no claim to that 
honorable name. 
We must begin to think of living in a world without war. With the 
development of modern weapons, war has lost its last semblance of logic 
and there is no reason under the sun why mankind should ever again 
resort to it. In past wars men may have cried, "Give me liberty or give me 
death." What they meant was, "I am willing to die in order that those I 
am defending may live." But modem war means that the defended wiU 
die as surely as the defenders; It means that nothing wiIl remain for the 
aggressors to grab. The idea-war, with the change in technology, must 
rest on its own logic; it can not take its impetus from the aggressor-and- 
defender war which it inevitably turned into, in the past. And the irre- 
ducible fact is this: there is no inherent logic in the idea-war-it simply 
makes no sense; it never did. 
What we must begin to reckon with, then, is the idea that technology 
has succeeded in doing what all the wit and piety of the moralists througIi 
the ages failed to do: it has utterly eliminated the logic of war. When 
that fact really sinks in, war may disappear from the face of the earth. 
The idea that war has lost its last claim to logic is sinking in, though 
the process, of course, is slow, maddeningly, dangerously slow. But at 
least men the world over are gradually digesting the crude facts of the 
situation: when the next war is finished there will be nothing for 
to want. The notion of Victory no longer makes sense. There is only de- 
feat and, as George Kennan has reminded us, the real defeat is the 
war itself, for it involves a common fate which will be visited on all who 
have anything to do with it. 
If this simple fad of life is not universally accepted now, it surely will 
be after the next war. The question facing us, then, is whether intelligence 
or frightful experience will set the clock. Will mankind d e  its decision 
about war before or after it has been conclusively, and tragically, demon- 
strated? 
I hold that this is the actual state of affairs. Moreover, I claim that it 
is known to military leaders and heads of state the world over. Yet we 
and the Russians continue to build armaments ever more horrible. That 
does not make much sense, does it? 
Yet I must admit that there may be no more sensible way to p r o d  
at the p e n t  time. Military disammnat is unthinkable until disarma- 
ment is politically possible, and disarmament will not be politically p- 
sible until the facts of modern war are universally recognized and univer- 
sally acted on. That at best will be a slow, gradual process. 
It will indeed be precariously slow, so slow that m e  can sympathize 
with the proponents of "ljmited warfare," who, with more faith in human 
intelligence and in moral resolve tban I can summon, want to restore 
the status quo ante as a product of decision rather than of scientific fact. 
One can also find understanding for those earnest advocates of nuclear 
"sanity," who sound to me like social workers running up and down the 
mmdors of a mental hospital demanding order. But I see real dangers 
in both movements. The first wants to delay mankind's decision about 
renouncing war; the second wants to rush it. Rushing it may be the more 
precarious, for if the decision is prematurely recognized and acted on 
before it truly is the decision of mankind evil consequences of unimagined 
scope may result 
On a matter like this, mankind can neither be delayed nor rushed. It 
will act as it always does, slowly and gradually. There will be no day on 
which all men will agree to find a substitute for war. But if tragedy can 
be averted in the meantime, the day will come when mankind will realize 
that it has f y d  me. 
Evil spawns evil and the substitute men find for war may have terrors 
for the world as homble in their own way as those begotten of war. I 
can not tell you what they will be; I can only await them with a goodly 
measure of trepidation. But in any case, even on that day when war is 
gone, I suspect that pacifism, understood not as the absence of war but 
as a thing of the Spirit, an Evangelical response to aggression, will still 
be a minority position. 
If we try to rush that day, we may bring down upon ourselves the 
cataclysm we all fear, for while we are doomed to await a greater aware- 
ness of the technological facts of life and more determination among 
governments to recogize them, we must admit that only the arms balance 
can keep us out of war. But the longer we live with this precarious bal- 
ance, as everyone knows, the more dangerous our situation-and the more 
possibility there is that a single false political move, an uncertain military 
gesture, even the much-dis&sed &reading of the radar screen, will 
set ofI World War 111. 
Bhuse  I believe all this is true, I have no answers to offer, and the 
answers of others usually strike me as either fatuous moralizing or wish- 
ful thinking. All I can say i s  that we must get used to living & the age 
of terror that we find ourselves in; at the same time we must learn to live 
in it as if the tamK did not exist. Those who cry havoc do not serve us 
well, no more than those who cry peace, peace when there is no peace. 
When George Kennan told students at the Princeton Theological Semi- 
nary that in & long run we have no choice but to throw okelves on 
the mercy of God, he was not, as I understood him, crying out his despair, 
nor was he retreating into mysticism. On the contrary, I take it that his 
statement grew out of a recognition, based an a shrewd analysis of the 
present sitiation, that mankind might yet be saved, if through the mercy 
of God we are protected from fatal politid folly, military stupidity and 
even such accidents as the misreading of the radar screen. From such 
dangers as these, however, we have nowhere to turn but to Heaven. 
If we survive the dread possibilities that now hang over us and finally 
realize that war has been outmoded, the proximate cause of our salvation 
will surely be that same Science which planned our destruction; the 
ultimate Cause-men of faith may acknowledge-will be the God of His- 
tory who, in a manner of speaking, has always seemed to have a special 
f&dness for irony. 
- 
WAR AS A MORAL PROBLEM 
As one of a non-religious (some of my friends might consider it an anti- 
religious) bent, it has always seemed to me impossibly ditlicult to deal 
with questions of war and statecraft as moral problems. If we are thinking 
of "war" in the abstract, we are thinking of one of the ugly facts of life- 
an institution which has characterized human society from time imme- 
morial, and which, like many other ugly facts of life, is in itself morally 
neutral. Like pain, pestilence or natural disaster, it presents a problem 
to the moralist; but the moralist can say nothing to those involved in 
war's agonies and m e 1  decisions. * 
If we are taIking about war in this abstract sense, it seems to me that 
only the absolute pacasts-those whom Father Murray too harshly de- 
scribes as harboring the "vulgar pacifism of sentimentalist and materialist 
inspirationm-are entitled to introduce the moral issue at all. It is their 
position that the organized taldng of human life is in itself so great an 
evil that no good which may be achieved by this means can render it a 
moral action. They make a moral issue of the institution of war itself (it 
must be admitted that a vast amount of history which is neither senti- 
mental nor materialist tends to support them); and it seems to me that . 
those unwilling to meet them on these high terms, those unable either ' 
to accept or refute their contention that all war is and of itself immoral, 
are forced to drop the whole moral argument to a lower plane. 
Unless we take our stand with the absolute pacifist, we are compelled 
to accept war in the abstract as a fact of life. Confronting it, we can no 
longer appeal to a set of moral absolutes. The whole argument shifts and 
tends to get lost in the sands and shoals of particular wars, particular 
circumstances, and the particular moral responsibilities carried by the 
individual in each of the many ways in which he is related to the social 
enterprise. It is clear that the aviators who dropped the atomic bomb on 
the defenseless women and children of Hiroshima, the statesmen who 
gave the orders that they should do it, and the publicists and politicians 
who created the "climate" in which the statesmen's decision was made 
inevitable, all occupied different ethical positions and confwnted different 
moral problems. If one accepts war of some kind, in some circumstances, 
waged in some degree of savagery, as a moral enterprise, then one is in- 
volved in these complexities of individual moral responsibility. One can- 
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not make the same answer to the individual conscientious objector, taught 
to believe that the taking of life is inherently wrong, as one makes to the 
statesman, taught to believe that his highest duty is the conservation of 
the safety and interest of the people to whom he is responsible, or to the 
publicist who advocates war or warlike courses (in which it is improbable 
that he will either have to kill others or risk being killed himself) because 
he believes that war will serve some higher end of freedom or justice. 
From these difliculties, which confront those who reject the position 
of the absolute pacifists, those who might be described as absolute bel- 
licists offer a logical, if unattractive, way out. If the cause is just, war is 
not only licit but morally required; one not only may but must fight for 
the right, and it follows that any kind of horror or violence that carries 
some reasonable chance of victory and will more quickly terminate the 
struggle is morally acceptable. This is the logic of the greater good. It 
was the logic of those who supported war against what seemed the posi- 
tive evil of Nazi, Fascist and Japanese aggression; it was also the logic 
which led such patently ethical men as Truman, Stimson and their ad- 
visers to incinerate the innocent non-combatants af Hiroshima in the 
nuclear fires. As John Cogley observes, most of us still feel that the war 
on Nazism was a morally justified enterprise-it was better to have fought 
that evil, even at the price of a slaughter, than to have acquiesced in it. 
But many of us still feel qualms about the Hiroshima and Nagasaki 
bombs, and, indeed, about the equally temble and indiscriminate Tokyo 
and Hamburg fireraids. 
We recoil from such consequences of the bellicist theory of the greater 
good, logical though they may be. And we recoil the more because all 
experience has taught us that no man (or nation) can be trusted mi- 
laterally to determine what is the greater good; no man can be judge in 
his own cause; no nation in defending its right can be sure that it is not 
unjustly trampling upon the rights of others; in fighting for what is right 
against what is evil it cannot know that its values are universal values. 
It cannot even be sure that military victory will conserve even its own 
concept of the right-and a great deal of history suggests that this is 
seldom the actual result. In the absence of a supra-national or super- 
human authority which can not only ascertain but unambiguously declare 
what is right and just in the affairs of nation-states, the bellicist theory 
(and I hope it is clear that I am thinking of bellicism in a just cause) offers 
us no exit from such contrasting difliculties as those of Hiroshima or of 
our acceptance of war against Germany and Japan. 
For those unable to condemn organized war as always and in itself 
immoral, there is only one solution. It is the solution adopted by Father 
Murray which, as Rabbi Schwanschild points out, is no different in es- 
sence from that adopted by the ancient Jews and by all later heirs of the 
JudeChristian ethic. War is morally acceptable only under certain rigid 
limits-limits as to purpose, ends and means. Pope Pius XI1 (and Father 
Murray, who so tightly expounds his teaching) discerns limitations dif- 
ferent from those which surrounded war in ancient Palestine, but the 
principle is the same. The case can be put by saying that the politician 
and publicist are justified in advocating war, the statesman is justified 
in accepting and waging war, and the soldier is justified in the killing 
necessary to success, if the origins and conduct of the war fuEll certain 
conditions. 
The conditions are that it must be a just war, by the best lights avail- 
able to those who participate in it. It must in addition be a defensive war; 
however just one's claims against others, they are not to be asserted by 4 
an organized military effort to establish them; a deferdoe war to repress 
injustice is permissible, but an offensive war for the same purpose is not. 
(This seems to rule out a military efFort by the West in support of the , 
Hungarian revolution.) The defense must be e@a&w, "undertaken 
with h o p  of success." This limitation, particularly salient in the nuclear 
age, rules out suicidal last stands; but the application of this latter princi- 
ple to nuclear weaponry, which appears to offer no hope of defensive 
success, only of revenge, is obscure. After these limitations on the pur- 
poses and ends of legitimate war, one comes to the crucial question of 
means. Father Murray offers the "principle of proportion." Even grave 
injustices may not be repressed by disproportionate military means-by 
means, that is, which would do greater damage than the continuation of 
the injustice. 
However tight and sound the principles, they do not seem to help us 
much in our problem. The Pope was willing to consider the liceity of 
megaton warfare "in the case in which it must be judged indispensable 
for self-defense." But on the other hand, he rejected as "immoral* the use 
of megaton and bacteriological warfare where it "entails such an exten- 
sion of the evil that it entirely escapes from the control of man." We are 
faced with a situation in which any war seems likely to escape entirely 
from the control of man (and I believe that we have in fact been faced 
with this situation since 1914) and one in which the resort to nuclear 
weapons can never be "indispensable to self-defense," since, so far as we 
know now, resort to the weapons can never promote defense. Maintaining ' 
them may do so, but using them can apparently promote nothing but a 
barren revenge and destruction. 
It is this paradox of the modem weapons which I feel Father Murray 
avoids. I am quite willing to accept the traditional position that war 
waged for right- ends, with limited purposes and by limited means, ' 
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with its unavoidable slaughter adjusted in correct proportion to the good 
which will be achieved by success, is a moral activity. Some of the terms 
are here rather hard to fill, but the rules or limits as defined seem to me 
acceptable, and I am not prepared to condemn the soldiers and sailors of, 
say, the eighteenth century, who did their bloody duty in an age in which 
this kind of rule and limit was both applicable and observed, as wicked 
or immoral men. My difficulty is that the rules are no longer applicable. 
Neither Pope Pius XI1 nor Father Murray supplies me with an answer 
to the one rather stark question: Was it right or wrong to incinerate sixty 
thousand noncombatant men, women and children at Hiroshima? Was 
President Truman (who bore the ultimate responsibility) a wicked man; 
was he a good man mistakenly adopting a wicked course, or was he a 
good man adopting a course which was good, under all the circum- 
stances? 
Father Murray's argument does not tell me. His quotations from Pope 
Pius XI1 do not tell me; and if my conscience required me (as it does 
not) to accept the Pope as a final authority on morals, I still think I would 
be left in a situation of considerable bafflement. This is what I meant by 
saying at the outset that it has always been difficult for me to deal with 
issues of statecraft and war as moral issues. My own belief is that the 
issues which modem war raises before us will be settled on practical rather 
tban moralistic terms. John Cogley has suggested that we are in fact 
facing the prospect of a world without war, and we will slowly adjust 
ourselves to a situation (it will by no means be an easy one) derived 
from pragmatic and not moralistic considerations. With this I agree, as 
it seems to me the only outcome short of total catastrophe. But if this 
is the outcome, it will be the moralists who will have to bring their views 
into accord with it. It will not come through the great society bringing its 
actions into accord with the teachings of the moralists. 
THE PACIFIST'S CHOICE 
Stephen G. Cay 
Ever since the time of Constantine, Christian theologians have been try- 
ing to find a way to wrap up the gospel of Christ and the institution of 
war in the same package. Sometimes they have enjoyed moderate suc- 
cess. When war was the private monopoly of various princes and was 
conducted according to well-defined rules with limited objectives, it was 
possible to rationalize it. But as the institution has grown in scope and 
ferocity, and its weapons in destructive power, the task has become more 
dif6cuk The ethic of love and the ICBM are simply not compatible, r e  
gardless of the theological garb in which they are presented. 
Yet the Church, rightly concerned with the problem of justice, cannot 
let go of the notion that the only way justice can be assured is through 
the amassing of military power. This being so, it must continue the 
struggle to jusw it, however tortuous and winding the road may be. 
None but the most hardy attempts any longer to bless full-blown, full- 
megaton nuclear war. The more manageable concept of limited war a p  
pears to d e r  some way out, and Father John Courtney Murray's article 
represents a brilliant attempt to establish it. His pleas for a restatement 
of the traditional position of the Church regarding the conditions under 
which it can support war is an appealing one, and his delineation of the 
role of the mralist in providing the necessary framework of restraint is 
admirably logical. 
But it seems to me that wen Father Murray fails in his task. Dr. Hartt, 
Rabbi Schwarzschild and, more recently, Walter Millis, have all raised 
grave doubts about his thesis, and they are doubts that I share. To talk 
of limited war in the atomic age is to try to turn back the clock. When 
survival is at stake, as it would be in any major war, it appears the height 
of folly to talk of applying reason to the situation. War's necessity is ter- 
rible and, once released, its course lies almost wholly beyond the compass ' 
of those who seek to make it the servant of their ends. To suggest that it I 
is possible to control it requires a rosier view of human nature than I am 
able to support. One is therefore driven to the conclusion that limited war ' 
offers no hiding place for the moralist; if so, there seems to be no other 
course for the Church but the ha1 rejection of war as an instrument for 
achieving justice. 
One other possible escape hatch does, however, remain: the concept 
I 
of armament as a deterrent. Can the Church jushfy the amassing of mili- 
tary power on the ground that the threat of its use will prevent the greater 
evil of Soviet aggression? There is no doubt that a strong moral case can 
be built for accepting the necessity for military power if it prevents war 
and if the time thereby gained can be used to work for the achievement 
of justice. Politically too, the deterrent concept has solid support. George 
Kennan, the father of containment, leaned heavily on it in suggesting 
that the United States develop a shield of strength to deter aggression 
at the same time that it sought through various positive approaches to 
eliminate the sources of conflict and lift the level of human life and dig- 
nity. This dual concept has in fact been at the root of our foreign policy 
ever since 1947. 
Finally, there is good historical precedent for such an approach. The 
British employed a similar policy with striking success during much of 
the last century, using their navy as a shield (and occasionally as an in- 
strument of oonquest) at the same time that they advanced democratic 
freedoms and human welfare at home and, to a certain extent, abroad. 
Pacifists could inveigh against this use of power, but they were hard put 
to it to support their case on grounds other than the pure teaching of the 
gospels. Logic and history were on the side of the realists, and the theo- 
logian could answer convincingly that the benefits to man outweighed 
the evil that might be involved in the application of military power. 
Unfortunately, however, we are no longer living in the nineteenth e n -  
tury, and this historid precedent, as well as the theological and political 
framework that sustains its modem counterpart, rests on assumptions 
that in my judgment are no longer valid. The whole case depends on the 
possibility of simultaneously providing military security with one hand 
while we work for the achievement of peace and justice with the other. 
I suggest that this cannot now be done. The advances in science have 
changed fundamentally the nature of security demands, and in a world 
in which power is both polarized and limitless the old rules and the old 
assumptions no longer apply. Military and strategic considerations will 
not stay neatly compartmentalized as they once would. Their demands 
are becoming pervasive and all-engulfing, to the point where every im- 
portant national decision must be taken in their terms. 
This is what has been happening during the past decade. Where, dur- 
ing this period, has the United States been able to make its important 
foreign policy decisions on the basis of justice or human welfare? Where 
is the limited use of power that George Kernan counseled in advocating 
his twin-pillared program? In area after area-Europe, North Africa, the 
Middle East, South East Asia, Japan, China-we have been driven by 
the relentless demands of the Cold War to make our choices in strategic 
terms. Economic policies, involving aid programs and world trade, hav6 
been dominated by military considerations. So has our policy toward the 
United Nations. The image of America in the eyes of the world has un- 
happily changed from that of champion of the oppressed to military giant, 
and we are bewildered because we have meant only to serve the ends of 
justice. 
This is our dilemma, and it goes much deeper than the intentions or 
the ampetence of our leadership. It goes to the question of choice- 
choice between continuing to seek security in our capacity to destroy, 
or seeking it through developing our capacity to change. It is perhaps a 
reflection of ow times that the choice is forced on us by logic and bie 
tory rather than by morality, but the theologian no less tban the rest of 
us must-face it, for there appears to be no refuge in deterrence any more 
than in nuclear war, limited or otherwise. 
It is a hard choice. involving the ultimate rejection of violence, but it 
is the only way to be free of the crippling limitations imposed by cam- 
mitment to the bomb. Once made, it provides a new basis for day-today 
decisions, and adds another voice to a minority calling for a new ap- 
proach to foreign relatims. This is its political relevance, for change in 
America is not produced by fiat but by the ever-shifting interaction of di- 
verse interest groups. The pacifist minority, like any ather, is politically 
important because it serves as a pole of discussion thmugh which it has 
a voice in the ultimate determination of policy. Obviously its influence 
is modest, but the vigor and depth vf its cmmmitment provide a dynamic 
for change that is lacking in middle-of-the-road approaches. Is it pos- 
sible that the bankruptcy of liberalism today is due at least in part to the 
fact that the liberal st i l l  clings to the idea that defense programs and 
welfare programs can be canied on together, with the result that he 
contniuttes not to change but ody to the schizophrenia of our times? 
Of course, a rejection of violence does not in itself release us from our 
problems. We must s t i l l  racognize the reality of evil, and discover how 
to deal with it in a way that preserves our values. It is somehow assumed 
that these questions do not con- the pist, that his position repre- 
sents abandonment of values and abject surrender to evil. Father Murray 
eschews both nuclear war and pacifism because uthese desperate alterna- 
tives [mean] either universal death or complete surrender to Commu- 
nism.'' The pacifist does not propose to surrender, and he is well aware 
that power is necessary in this world, but he seeks to develop a concep- 
tion of power appropriate for our Christian plrposes and our nuclear 
times. He believes that organized, disciplined good will can be both a 
massive instrument for justice and a potent weapon of defense, as in- 
deed it has become in the hands of a Gandhi or a Martin King. Men are 
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not saints; neither are they devils. To suggest that they could rise to the 
challenge of non-violent resistance on the orie hand or be moved by it 
on the other is not to look through rose-colored glasses. Is it so impos- 
sible to conceive of man, still nasty to his neighbor, still on occasion 
beating his wife, but reacting with horror to the suggestion that he launch 
a missile to destroy a million lives? Our problem lies in the ironic fact 
that today the general rule is just the opposite. 
My plea for men of conscience to face at last the necessity for a per- 
sonal rejection of war is made without any hope that it offers a panacea. 
The pacifist must recognizs the possibility of invasion, just as the non- 
pacifist must recognize the possibility that he may have to w e  the bomb 
-and both must decide how they would face these ultimate failwes. The 
pacifist must admit that he has no answer when the h e  breaks out, but 
he can logically argue that no one else has either. 
These arguments anly emphasize the fad that the pacifist, like other 
men, can only see a little way down the road. Politically, he insists only 
that there is more creative potential and less risk in massive efforts to se- 
cure justice than in massive efforts to secure military power, and since 
he believes a choice must be made between them he is compelled to 
throw his individual weight on the side of justice. He rests his case there, 
with the suggestion that the time to start making a new approach is now, 
and the place to start is with ourselves. He thinks the Church would more 
adequately fulfill its mission in these tragic times if it abandoned the 
impossible search for a moral justification for militarism, and tumed its 
attention to discovering alternative sources for national security. When a 
society reaches the kind of impasse in which ours finds itself today-when 
it talks about "safety as the twin brother of adhilation'' and would be- 
tray its values in the name of protecting them-salvation is not to be 
gained by more calculation of expediency but by rebirth. 
FACTS, CALCULATION AND POLITICAL ETHICS 
Ernest W. Lefeuer 
George F. Kennan has given some advice to moralists concerned with 
nuclear weapons and international politics.* Much of his adyice is 
good. He warns against "pouring Christian enthusiasm into unsuitable 
vessels . . . designed to contain the earthly calculations of practical poli- 
ticians." His lucid statement on the limits of the United Nations and for- 
eign economic aid can help provide the basis for morally responsible sup- 
port of these widely misunderstood foreign policy instruments. His com- 
ments on the moral ambiguities in the colonialism issue are timely. 
But when Mr. Kennan deals with nuclear weapons and bomb tests, he 
falls into the very legalism and moral absolutism he denounces so effec- 
tively when he analyzes the UN, foreign aid and colonialism. Perhaps 
the chief reason for this contradiction is his ambiguous attitude toward 
calculation in world politics. Pointing to "the irony that seems to rest on 
the relationship between intentions of statesmen and the results they 
achieve," Mr. Kennan concludes that the statesman "is best off when he 
is guided by firm and sound principles idtead of depending exdusively 
on his own farsightedness and powers of calculation." If it is difficult for 
the statesman to calculate with assurance, how much more difficult it is 
for the "Christian onlooker." 
Mr. Kennan understands the limits of human calculation in politics, 
but he fails to reoognize its possibilities. He seems to overlook the fact 
that calculation is both a political and moral necessity. Calculation is 
the rational process by which men relate human and material resources 
to their goals. Calculation is the life blood of politics and the heart of 
ethics. Calculation is the bridge between the given and the desired, be- 
tween facts and dreams. 
Some moralists have attempted to bridge the gulf between political 
necessity and high moral principle by "middle axioms" or practical rules 
which can guide the citizen or statesman in relating the is to the ought. 
But who really believes there are laws or axioms for every occasion? And 
if there were, who would know which one to apply? 
Even "simple" human problems such as rearing a four-year-old child 
are too complex to be handled by a legal sliderule. A mother must take 
* See Appendix. 
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many calculated risks every day as she attempts to anticipate the prob- 
able effect of alternative lines of action on the character of her child and 
on the serenity of her household. Perhaps a calculated risk is a better 
risk than an uncalculated risk. 
If calculation is a necessity in child rearing, it is an even greater ne- 
cessity in the incredibly more complex business of world politics. Yet, 
Mr. Kennan advises "the government," apparently as a political and 
moral alternative to calculation, to use "good methods" rather than "bad 
ones." He says we can be "as sure that the good methods will be in some 
way useful as that bad ones will be in some way pernicious." A govern- 
ment should be guided by "firm and sound principles instead of depend- 
ing exclusively" on its "powers of calculation." "A government can pur- 
sue its purpose in a patient and conciliatory and understanding way, re- 
specting the interests of others and infusing its behavior with a high 
standard of decency and honesty and humanity . . . sheer good manners 
will bring some measure of redemption to even the most disastrous un- 
dertaking." What help are Mr. Kennan's manners and principles to a 
statesman wrestling with the recurrent Berlin crisis? How could they have 
helped the South Koreans when their country was attacked in 19501 
If Mr. Kennan has not confused manners and morals, it seems clear 
that he has confused manners with policy-a dangerous error for a per- 
son in a position of responsibility. In politics the substance of the re- 
sponse counts most. The manner of the response may be important, but 
it is not a substitute for policy. 
Principles, goals and values are inescapably involved in all political 
decisions. The principles may be good or bad, the goals worthy or un- 
worthy, the values enduring or ephemeral. These intangible ingredients 
are present in every political act whether the actor is a Hitler, a Khrush- 
chev, or an Eisenhower. No statesman can make policy from principles 
alone. He must relate goals and ideals to the political facts of life. This 
means calculation. And calculation is the foundation of strategy and tac- 
tics-policy . 
Incidentally, Jesus of Nazareth apparently assumed that statesmen had 
a moral obligation to calculate, to analyze the balance of power between 
two hostile camps. "Or what king, going to encounter another king in 
war, will not sit down first and take counsel whether he is able with ten 
thousand to meet him who comes against him with twenty thousand? 
And if not, while the other is yet a great way off, he sends an embassy 
and asks terms of peace." (Luke 14:32, 33. ) 
The simple fact is that Mr. Kernan does not fdow his own advice. 
He makes particular policy proposals for particular problems and he 
bases his proposak on calculation. His controversial "disengagement" pro- 
posals for easing tension in Europe and his more recent implied proposals 
for ending nuclear tests were not based on moral maxims alone. They 
emerged from a rational attempt to relate facts to values, which cer- 
tainly included a calculation of the probable consequences of competing 
policies. 
The larger fact is that everyone instinctively makes moral-political cal- 
culations when dealing with world politics. The real issue is not: shall 
we calculate or shall we not? The real question is: what factors shall we 
take into account when we calculate and what weight shall we give 
them when we make policy? 
Sir Winston Churchill once said that "facts are better than dreams." 
What he meant is that neither the statesman nor the citizen can make 
politically wise and morally responsible judgments by consulting only his 
goals. He must amsult the facts-the universal facts about man and his- 
tory, and tba particular facts about a political situation. The dream with- 
out the fact leads to this-worldly nightmares or to other-worldly escape. 
The fact without the dream leads to boredom and despair. 
Mr. Kennan's nonchalant attitude toward facts and calculation in the 
area of nuclear weapons leads to less than adequate moral and political 
judgments This same nonchalance has crept into some of the previous 
essays in worIdvCew on the same subject. 
After quoting a "random sampling'' of press reports on the dangers of 
nuclear fallout, Mr. Kennan concludes: "But whoever gave us the right, 
as Christians, to take even one innocent life?" His implied judgment that 
all bomb tests under all circumstances are morally wrong seems to be 
based in part upon a picture of fallout danger that bears little resem- 
blance to the findings of leading research institutions here and abroad. 
Earlier contributors to this debate in the pages of worldview have also 
made rather unqualified generalizations about the destructiveness of nu- 
clear weapons. John Cogley says: "Modem war means that the defended 
will die as surely as the defenders; it means that nothing will remain for 
the aggressors to grab." Walter Millis seems to share the same view: 'We 
are faced with a situation in which any war seems likely to escape entirely 
from the control of man . . . so far as we know now, resmt to [nuclear 
weapons] can never promote defense." Stephen G. Cary says: =To talk 
of limited war in the atomic age is to try to turn back the clock. When 
survival is at stake . . . it appears the height of folly to talk of applying 
reason to the situation. War's necessity is terrible and, once released, its 
course lies almost wholly beyond the compass of those who seek to make 
it a servant of their ends." He adds: "To suggest that it is possible to 
control it requires a rosier view of human nature than I am able to sup- 
port." 
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(Apparently Mr. Cary seems to overlook the fact that control and re- 
straint in international politics, and human relations generally, do not de- 
pend mainly on the "goodness of men" but.rather on a balance of forces 
and interests among sinful men. Both the Communists and the United 
States showed great restraint in the Korean War. Neither side used 
atomic weapons. The Commdsts did not use submarines and we did not 
bomb beyond the Yalu River. Apparently it was in the interest of both 
sides to exercise restraint. Is it too much to suggest that in a future con- 
flict, even in this nuclear age, there may be important factors on both 
sides which in the name of prudence, even experllency, make for re- 
straint? To suggest this is a possibility does not imply a "rosy" view of 
man. Rather it acknowledges that God can make the self-interest of hos- 
tile nations to praise Him. ) 
These four men and many other morally concerned persons tend to 
expect the worst in the event of serious hktilities and they tend to ex- 
aggerate that worst. It is important to consider soberly the findings of 
respecfed research institutions. 
According to the best projections available the maximum possible loss 
of life from a general nuclear war involving the full present capacities 
of the Soviet Union and the United States would be about twenty per- 
cent of the earth's population. The number killed might well be consid- 
erably less. There would be practically no casualties of any kind south 
of the equator. If the United States had a comprehensive fallout shelter 
program in operation, eighty million or more additional American lives 
probably would be saved. These estimates include persons killed by blast 
and radioactivity. 
Among the eighty percent who would survive such a war, the natural 
genetic damage to the human race might be doubled in areas of heavy 
fallout. Any injury is always an individual tragedy. But genetic damage 
resulting from tests or from general war or both, like the number of au- 
tomobile deaths in the United States, is well within the range of what a 
civilized society is prepared to tolerate. 
Every human life is precious in the eyes of God, and even one inno- 
cent death or crippling disease is one too many. Any decent human be- 
ing recoils from the horror of a lynching or a nuclear war. We are all 
agreed here. 
The problem we are concerned with as American citizens is what na- 
tional security policy the United States should pursue. Faced with the 
possibility of a catastrophic nuclear holocaust on the one hand and a 
dynamic and expansionist Sino-Soviet bloc on the other, shall we rec- 
ommend a radical change in our present foreign policy? 
Many pacifists and nLpacifisti say we s h o d d - ~ ~  comments are di- 
rected primarily to the neo-pacifists who insist that we are confronted by 
an entirely new situation as a result of the technological revolution. Mr. 
Cogley says: W e  must begin to think of living in a world without war. 
With the development of modem weapons, war has lost its last semblance 
of logic." Mr. Kennan says: "I am skeptical of the meaning of 'victory' 
and 'defeat' in their relation to modem war between great countries." 
Today, says Mr. Cary, "the old rules and the old assumptions no longer 
apply .= 
The assumption that we are in a radically new situation, upon which 
these appraisals are made, is itself subject to question. I would hold that 
the basic realities of politics among sovereign states have more in com- 
mon with previous eras than they have differences. The main elements 
then and now are the visions, interests and demands of morally ambiguous 
men projected from the vantage point of national power. The new ele- 
ment is technological, but even the drastic discontinuity in this realm 
does not mean that there has been a corresponding discontinuity in the 
history of man, much less in the pride and passions of man. 
If calculations of those in the best position to know are reasonably ac- 
curate, the worst nuclear war possible now would leave eighty percent 
of the earth's population alive and healthy. Such a war is probably the 
least likely contingency, but it seems to be the only contingency that the 
neo-pacifists talk about. It is possible, perhaps probable, that World War 
111 will be less destructive than World War 11, or even than World War I. 
Many students of military strategy believe that it is militarily redundant 
and politically unwise to hock out population centers, and that a future 
war may well be more concentrated on military targets, such as air and 
missile bases, than was World War 11. 
And there is nothing in history or in Judeo-Christian religious ethics 
which makes a general nuclear war inevitable. We may have limited 
wars, limited by political objectives, and therefore limited in terms of the 
weapons employed. Korea was limited. So was every violent conflict 
since the end of World War 11. We can have limited conventional wars 
like Korea. We could have a limited atomic war. Limited wars are 
dangerous because they have present within them the seeds of a general 
conflict, but the possibdity of prudential restraint should neither be over- 
looked nor counted upon. 
In short, there are many possible forms of military conflict. None of 
them is attractive, but certainly a limited engagement is far less unat- 
tractive than an unlimited ho1ocaust. 
What does this mean for moralists and statesmen who are wrestling 
with the nuclear weapons question? Does it mean we should destroy our 
stockpile of atomic weapons regardless of what the U.S.S.R. does? Does 
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it mean that we should unilaterally cease U. S. nuclear tests? I am not 
going to deal with specific policy questions here, except to say that I am 
gratified that the United States has extended a self-imposed nuclear test 
ban until the end of 1959 in order to give our negotiators at Geneva more 
time to reach a viable ban agreement with the Soviet Union. I hope that 
an effective test-ban agreement with adequate international inspection 
provisions can be hammered out. 
One final point. In addition to emphasizing the moral necessity of cal- 
culation based upon the most sigdicant relevant facts, I would like to 
suggest that one is obligated to examine with equal thoroughness the 
probable consequences of the policy he advocates and the policy he re- 
jects. A policy designed to save ten thousand persons from possible fu- 
ture death by radioactivity which had the actual effect of inviting the 
death of ten million persons or the enslavement of a hundred million 
persons today could hardly be called morally responsible or politically 
wise. 
ETHICS AND "CALCULATION" 
John C. Bennett 
I have no quarrel with Dr. Lefever's plea for calculation as one tries to 
relate ethics to policy, but I think that he has gone far toward losing the 
ethics in the calculation and that his own example of calculation needs to 
be challenged radically. 
One example of this loss of ethics in calculation is the sentence: "But 
genetic damage resulting from tests or general war or bath, like the 
number of automobile deaths in the United States, is well within the 
range of what a civilized society is prepared to tolerate." I assume that 
"tolerate" is used in some technical sense and not in a moral sense, but 
even so the sentence is one of the most appalling that I have ever read. 
For one thing, the people who are killed in automobiles usually choose to 
ride in automobiles; whereas most of the victims of tests and of nuclear 
war would have had no chance to make such a choice. They would be the 
victims of a few distant policy-makers. I think that the traditional distinc- 
tion between combatants and non-combatants In war does not fit the 
present realities, but, on any showing, future generations should be re- 
garded as nonoombatants. For contern- policy-makers to assume 
that they are so right that they can nonchalantly wndemn a large num- 
ber of unborn children to various kinds of genetic distortion is the sus- 
pension of ethics. 
I often think that in this respect there is among some of us an interest- 
ing parallel to the Communist suspension of ethics. The Communists sac- 
rifice people who are now living for the sake of a political policy which 
is supposed to benefit future generations, but our tendency is to sacrifice 
future generations for a supposed benefit to people now living. Of the two 
types of ethical calculation, I  that the Communist calculation, as a 
form of ethical calculation, is more defensible. 
AU that Dr. Lefever says about the probable consequences of nuclear 
war needs to be challenged both in terms of some other consequences 
which are as important as those which he mentions, and in terms of some 
estimate of the consequences of the worst alternative to general nuclear 
war. His most arresting point is that "the maximum possible loss of life 
from a general nuclear war involving the full capacities of the Soviet 
Union and the United States would be about twenty percent of the 
earth's population." He goes on to say: 'There would be practically no 
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casualties of any kind south of the equator." I can only outline my aiti- 
cisms of his extraordinarily complacent presentation of these conclusions. 
1. If his statistics are correct, they would not apply ten years from 
now if the nuclear arms race continues with full force. Since a war in any 
event is not likely in the immediate future, it is important to look at the 
probable consequences of present policy under the technological con- 
ditions a decade hence. 
2. If there are to be no casualties south of the equator, what would be 
the percentage of the population north of the equator that would be killed 
or injured, and what would be the effect of this on the communities north 
of the equator? 
3. Such a war would not only destroy the number of people of whom 
Dr. Lefever speaks; it would also destroy the fabric of community in 
many nations. It might even wipe out or almost wipe out whole nations 
which cover a small territory, such as Britain. 
4. Dr. Lefever says that "the worst nuclear war now possible would 
leave eighty percent of the earth's population alive and healthy." They 
might be without bodily injury but what about their moral and emotional 
health? The moral trauma resulting from such a war would probably be 
beyond anything that we can imagine. 
5. How much chance would there be for the Sunival of the institu- 
tions of political and spiritual freedom after such a catastrophe? Inciden- 
tally, these institutions flourish most north of the equator! Mere survival, 
bread and order, would for a long time be more important to people than 
freedom. If Dr. Lefever is interested in avoiding objectionable types of 
political systems by the policies which he recommends, he is likely to fail 
if they result in general war. 
8. There is a-whole range of questions which are almost never dis- 
cussed having to do with what the worst alternative to general war might 
be if we are faced with ultimate choices. Suppose that Communist nations 
were able to extend their power, what in the long run might we expect? 
Just as Dr. Lefever plays down the consequences of war, it might be quite 
as convincing to play down the consequences of allowing Communism 
to find its level in the world without decisive military opposition but 
with many kinds of resistance in the various countries. For one thing, 
Communism has shown that it can change in a few decades and become 
a less intolerable form of society. Its wurst consequences might last for a 
shorter time than the worst consequences of a general nuclear war. Also, 
there is a question that needs much exploration as to how far Russia 
would be able to exercise oppressive control at a distance. She has dif- 
ficulty even now with Poland. She has allowed Yugoslavia to get out 
fmm under her control. Is it not possible that the degree of oppressive- 
ness of Communist control would depend upon the dynamics within a 
country? Forms of resistance to Communism in each country might still 
go on that would be more relevant to its characteristic type of power than 
nuclear bombs. If there developed a strong and fanatical Communist 
movement within a country, the worst type of oppression might take place 
for a limited period. In some cases proximity to Russia might have the 
same effect as it does in the case of Hungary and East Germany. What 
is likely to be the eeed of more humane institutions in Russia on the de- 
gree of ruthlessness it would exercise abroad? What may be the effect of 
the rivalry of the great Communist powers in leaving a space for some 
form of freedom for other oountries? I have raised these points, not be- 
cause I am dogmatic about them, but because they are so seldom men- 
tioned. I wish that Dr. Lefever would put his acute mind on them with 
as ruthless an openness to what may be the realities as he has tried to cul- 
tivate in regard to the consequences of war. 
I am sure Dr. Lefever and I would agree that the test of any policy is 
whether it succeeds in preventing both of these ultimate disasters. So 
long as there is hope of doing so, we need to have a balanced policy based 
upon the calculation as to how to prevent them both. But I see in Dr. 
Lefever's argument a strange callousness that &ay undermine the im- 
perative to prevent the general nuclear war. This could profoundly warp 
policy. We may grant that there are risks in any policy, but is it right to 
assume that the risks must always run in the one direction? 
RIGHT AND WRONG CALCULATION 
Paul Ramey 
"Calculation is the life blood of politics," writes Ernest W. Lefever, "and 
the heart of ethics" (italics added). This statement should be subjected 
to thorough scrutiny, and searchingly criticized. 
Indeed, calculation is the heart of ethics as Mr. Lefever understands 
it. For this reason, there is for him no particular difEculty about making 
ethico-political judgments; and there is little to disturb or limit the "moral- 
political calculations" of which he speaks, since the heart of morality was 
already assumed to be calculative. Research the facts and weigh them 
properly: this is about all that is needed in politics; and, happily, also 
about all it is the business of ethics to do. 
Of course, uniquely ethical terms are used at decisive points in this 
analysis; and they have to be understood and not dismissed for not play- 
ing an effective role. What is meant by the statement that "principles, 
goals and values are inescapably involved in all political decisions"? It 
seems clear in the context of the whole article that the words "principles" 
and "values" perform the same function and have the same place in re- 
lation to political decision and action as the word "goals." Mr. Lefever 
writes that "no statesman can make policy from principles alone"; and this 
sentence is followed immediately by: "He must relate goals and ideals to 
the political facts of life." It is not wrong to regard the second sentence 
as bearing a relation of "Hebrew parallelismn to the first; and to con- 
clude that the word "principles" means the same as the words "goals" and 
"ideals." 
We may reach the same conclusion from considering Mr. Lefever's as- 
sertion about George Kennan's "disengagement" proposals: 'They 
emerged from a rational attempt to relate facts to values, which certain- 
ly included a calculation of the$robable consequences of competing pol- 
icies." Here, it may be allowed, not all "consequencesn are "values"; but 
still values are always only among the consequences, and there is no 
value (or moral "principle") that is not among the consequences and 
therefore correctly related to action through calculation. A "principle" 
operates in this analysis of politics in the same way as a "value"; and a 
"value" means a "goal" or "ideal"-perhaps even a "dream." 
This means that, in Mr. Lefever's opinion, ethics is wholly future-fac- 
ing; and therefore, since obviously calculation is future-facing, ethics and 
political calculation go nicely together, and in fact calculation is the 
heart of ethics. Far from this being the case, we must affirm to the con- 
trary that a wholly teleological view of ethics amounts to the suspension 
of ethics. This is the case whether our goals are spiritual or material, 
whether the ideals or values we seek are believed to be on earth or in 
heaven. If no more can be said about the morality of &ion than can be 
derived backward from the future goal, thus unrolling toward the present 
the path that we shall have to tread by deeds determined by calculating 
their utility, ethics has already more than half-way vanished, i.e., it has 
became calculation of the means to projected ends. 
Of course, these ends, goals, values toward which "moral-political cal- 
culation" is directed may themselves be high and mighty important ones, 
and it does make a great deal of difference what are the goals or values 
a society seeks. Still, this is to say that there is nothing that should not 
be done which a future-facing calculation seems to require; and no action 
which can be calculated to produce the described result which should 
not therefore be defined as good. Such a view has to be rejected as the 
suspension of a great part of ethics, without in any sense minimizing the 
significance of calculation for both ethics and politics. 
Protestant Christian ethics today comes from a long h e  of prudent 
people. The pacifism which between *the world wars spread widely in 
the non-peace churches, the non-pacifism which gradually overcame this 
as World War I1 approached and which continues today, the increasing 
pragmatism of the Niebuhrians, the rejection of natural law and "middle 
axiomsm in favor of contextualism and the study of "decision makingm- 
all this has been largely a matter of determining the 'lesser evil" or per- 
chance the "greater good," and, by a calculation of the facts, finding the 
path along which action should be directed in order to defend or secure 
some sort of values at the end of the road toward which action reaches, 
yet never reaches. This is an ethic well calculated to reduce every present 
reality-people and principles no less than facts-altogether to what they 
may do to bring in the future. Against this, it should be afttmed that 
"prudencen has rightly to be understood to be in the service of some 
prior principle, whether in application of natural law principles or (if, as 
I believe, these alone are inadequate) in application of divine charity. 
No one can read the so-called Dun report of the Federal Council of 
Churches ("The Christian Conscience and Weapons of Mass Destruc- 
tion," December, 1950) without feeling the moral confusion beneath its 
weak rejection of "total" war. The "sense" in which total war was re- 
pudiated was there dehed as "war in which all moral restraints are 
thrown aside and all the purposes of the community are fully controlled 
by sheer military expedience"; and this clearly meant, in the main, wan- 
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ton killing or a savagery that kills without reckoning: W e  cannot, there- - ,  ' - 
fore, be released from the responsibility for doing no more hurt than I 1  
must be." In other words, the main consideration effective in this report 
was the prudential balancing of effects, of greater against lesser evils. ' ' ,  
When prudence stands so nearly alone, and only in the context of a ' 
teleological ethic, it is not surprising that for long stretches of the way, , 
with the exception of a few unassimilated sentences about the moral im- I 
munity of non-combatants, this report sounds rather like a statement of - ' 
standards for the Housing, Care and Surgical Handling of Laboratory I 
I  L Animals. After all, in the latter case no one countenances wanton cruelty, 
and the teleologically suspended ethics of the code of the S.P.C.A. is 
. ,. 
quite capable of ruling that it is "immoral" to use methods that cause I  I  
laboratory rats more pain and maiming without commensurate medical , , , I 
or scientific decisiveness. This outlook has not yet come upon my crucial . I f ,  ' 
moral considerations. 1 1 
Robert L. Calhoun, therefore, was quite correct when in his minority 
statement he wrote concerning the majority opinion: "The norm of prac- 
tically dective inhibitions turns out to be, after all, military decisive- - 
ness; but beyond ruling out wanton destructiveness, Christian conscience 
in wartime seems to have chiefly the effect (certainly important but 
'scarcely decisive) of making Christians do reluctantly what military . 
necessity requires." Not only a pacifist like Calhoun should be able to I  
say this, but anyone from whose conscience the principles of the just . I 
war doctrine have not been completely eroded, as against mere future- .. 
facing calculation of consequences. The morality of means referred to in l 1  ; , 
the "justified" war theory meant more than the inert weapon as such; it ' , 
meant the corrduct of war as such, the action as a whole and its nature, 
which had a morality or an immorality not wholly swallowed up in con- I r 
sequences or in motive to ends believed to justify any action that may be ' I 1 "  
' thought to have military decisiveness. I  I I 
Mr. Lefever's reduction of ethics to calculation leaves him unable l I l  -:A" 
I l l  properly to understand George Kennan's pronouncements . on nuclear 1 
', ' 
'tests and nuclear weapons, and incapable of pointing out what has been 1 
correct and what mistaken in Kennan's statements. He cites, for example, , ' 
'the latter's remark about the danger from nuclear fallout: "Whoever gave . I. 
'us the right, as Christians, to take even one innocent life?" This, Mr. Le- 1 
I1 I I1 fever says, illustrates "Mr. Kennan's nonchalant attitude toward facts 1 1 ,  I 
, and caldation in the area of nuclear weapons." Actually, this shows 'the : " 
one grave mistake Kennan has made in the use of ethical pdlzciples; and 1 1 :  ! 
I  I  I  II this needs to be corrected before Mr. Lefever or anyone else launches 1 
fused, nonchalantly or otherwise. 
I  I' 
I .  
I '  
' I  
The basic error in theoretical analysis is that in what he says about the 
future innocents who may die as a result of present tests, Mr. Kennan - 
treats the probable e f e t  of our present actions as if it were a means at 
present employed to obtain the ends we desire. The time-sequence of 
the acts put forth by men or nations cannot be reversed in this way. All 
action thrusts toward the future, and many or most actions have double 
or multiple effects or consequences in the future; and this raises ques- 
tions of a different order from the ethics of the means or the nature of 
the present action as such. 
Granted that the death of one child from man-made leukemia will be 
evil in itself, there is a si@ca.nt distinction still to be made between 
whether this is an effect among many other good and evil effects that will 
result from our present course of action, or whether it is a means which, 
intentionally and in and of itself, objectively as well as subjectively, is 
ordered to the achieving of some choice-worthy goal. 
While the end may never justify the means, m e  effect justifies another 
effect, in the sense that an evil, unavoidable effect may be produced if 
that is the only way, by action not wrong in itself, to secure some very 
good result Now we come, and only at this point, do we come, to the 
proper work of calculation, in the comparison of effects, weighing their 
gravity, estimating the dc iency  of the reasons for them, and balancing 
greater against lesser goods or lesser evils. 
To no one except Mr. Lefever will it seem that Kennan's "implied judg- 
ment that all bomb tests under all circumstances are morally wrong 
seems to be based in part upon a picture of fallout danger that bears 
little resemblance to the findings of leading research institutions in this 
country and abroad." How can it seriously be suggested that Kennan cal- 
culated, or mWculated, his way to the absolute judgment about not 
taking one innocent life? If this was mistaken as applied to nuclear tests, 
it was a mistake in principle, in not distinguishing between taking human 
life as a means, and unavoidably taking human life as one of the indirect 
effects of action, to some good end. 
Presumably there will be a degree of genetic havoc, and an increase 
by an unknown number of the cases of leukemia, to result from joint 
underground nuclear explosions, recently proposed by Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, 
since a "negligible" amount of radiation will leak out through cracks in 
the mountain, but a possible result may also be a greater likelihood of 
agreement on banning future tests because the nations may learn how 
to perfect the instruments for detecting them. Mr. Lefever should say to 
Mr. Kennan: this good and that evil have to be calculated and weighed 
the one against the other; and your refusal to pay proper attention to the 
facts results from your failure to see that a possibly evil effect that may 
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follow along with good effects from any action is not to be understood 
as an immoral me&s causally conducive to one of these other effects as 
an end. 
Then only will the ground in morality be made secure beneath Mr. Le- 
fever's o& contentiws: (1) ''~enetic damage resulting from tests or 
general war or both, like the number of automobile deaths in the United 
States, is well within the range of what a civilized society is prepared to 
tolerate." (2) "A policy desi&ed to save ten thousand persons from pos- 
sible future death by radioactivity which had the actual effect of in- 
viting the death of ten million persons today could hardly be called 
morally responsible or politically wise." 
No one should wince at these statements, p d e d  it is clear that a 
society engaging in these calculations as to the indirect effects of action 
would already have become uncivilized if it engages at all in a like cal- 
culation at another point, i.e., if it might under certain circumstances be 
persuaded that the life of one or the fives of ten or ten thousand may be 
directly repressed simply as a means that good may come of it. 
But Mr. Lefever jumps altogether over the morality of action when 
at another point he becomes absorbed in calculations-calculation which 
is always only a subordinate part of moral judgment and to be entered 
upon logically only after the ethical guidelines 6f action have been fixed. 
"According to the best projections available," he writes, "the maximum 
possible loss of life from a general nuclear war involving the full present 
capacities of the Soviet Union and the United States would be about 
twenty percent of the earth's population. The number killed might well 
be considerably less. There woad be practically no casualties of any 
kind south of the equator. . . . If calculations of those in the best posi- 
tion to know are reasonably accurate, the worst nuclear war possible now 
would leave eighty prcent of the earth's population alive &d healthy." 
It is not that this calculation in the case of nuclear war, like David, 
has already killed its ten thousands, while calculation in the case of nu- 
clear testing, like Saul, has already killed only its thousands. At its heart, 
ethics counts not in quantities and, as Kant said, you cannot do morality 
a greater disservice than by deriving it from experience. It is rather that 
the death and devastation contemplated in the case of all-out nuclear 
war would be both directly willed and directly done as a means, while 
the death brought about by nuclear testing as such is only indirectly willed 
and indirectly done as one among several effects of the tats. 
The first murder, the second tragic. In the one case, death to the 
innocent is the instrument used for defense or victory; in the other case, 
death to the innocent is a foreknown side-effect of gction done in such 
a way as may be judged to be good, or at least neutral, in itself, and to 
be necessary to obtain great good results. The latter calculation con- 
cerning nuclear tests may be wrong; but in the former case it would be 
wrong to calculate and count on the good or less evil consequences that 
may come from a wrong done (acts of all-out nuclear war). 
The recent utterances of George Kennan have all been, not calls to 
abandon calculation, but to abandon calculation in the wrong place, in 
the place of fundamental moral principle. He has tried to recall us to the 
only doctrine of civilized warfare the West has known, to a reexamina- 
tion as a "straight issue of conscience" of the degree of acceptance of in- 
discriminate bombing by nuclear weapons that is present in our nuclear 
deterrence policy, and to call us b ~ c k  from our apparent willingness to 
rest our security (as he said to the W d s  Democratic Club in Wash- 
ington, D. C. ) an weapons designed to "destroy innocent noncombatant 
human life, including the lives of children, on a vast scale," back from 
"an infinitely costly and hopeless exercise in reciprocal menace" by means 
which it would be vastly immoral ever to use. 
There can be no greater evil, I take Kennan to be saying, than the act 
of using unlimited weapons all-out; and the one thing worse than to suffer 
such an evil would be to do it. Sophistry has always opposed a Gorgias 
who declares this to be the case. Kennan is quite right, no calculation 
taught him this, nor should calculation be allowed to deprive him or us 
of a forever valid moral judgment. 
It is interesting that at one point Mr. Lefever speaks of the lack of 
statesmanlike utility to be found in "Mr. Kennan's manners and prin- 
ciples." It is very true that the latter's principles, like his "sheer good 
manners," would be falsified and dispelled if either were sought to be 
leveled to the one dimension of their future-facing consequences. Good 
manners like good morals are never qualities wholly teleologically oriented 
or derived; and while calculation is of service to both, it cannot be the 
heart of either. Manners and morals have, in different ways, to do with 
the defmition of right conduct and not only with the ends of action; with 
the how and not only with whut we do or the whither of our deeds. 
Mr. Kennan has not confused manners with morals or manners with 
policy, as Mr. Lefever asserts, unless the substance of policy and of morals 
is supposed to embrace only "moral-political calculation" and to be ex- 
hausted in their teleological reference to the goals of action. It is alto- 
getaer praiseworthy that Kennan has emphasized that the principles of 
political conduct, or the conduct of politics, govern action as such in 
more ways than is required by a calculative utility. It is good also that 
Kernan, experienced as he is in the practice of diplomacy, assures ama- 
teurs who are apt to believe such principles to be reeds shaken by every 
wind that blows from over our future goals, and apt also, as outsiders to 
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affairs of state, to believe realistic calculation affords a greater surety and 
a clearer direction, that a statesman's "farsightedness and powers of cal- 
culation" alone may d e n  not be worth relying m. He calls us neither 
to. policies guided -only by principles withkt -calculation (as do some 
neo-pacifists) nor (as do many of his critics) to policies guided only by 
prudent calculation and doubtfully amtrolled by "ideals." 
In this sense, Mr. Lefever, not Mr. Kennan, is the "idealist" in politics. 
The idealist is one who goes on his way and finds his way under the lure 
of such g d  as the greatest good of the greatest number, etc. A realist 
is one who knows that there are many ways that reasonably may be sup 
posed to lead there, ranging all the way from the noblest to the most 
wicked political decisions and action; and he reminds the calculative 
idealist that in politics he had better know more than this about right and 
wrong conduct. 
We shall have to know more than this if mankind in the state of modern 
civilization is going to make it around the next turn. Those who say that 
it may not b e  possible for us to limit warfare are almmt certainly ax- 
rect. surely w& will never be kept a just endurable human entbrise 
if it is sought to be kept limited only "by political objectives, and there- 
fore limited in terms of the weapons employed" and if fear alone is in- 
voked to restrain the means. Limited ends do tend to moderate the means 
ventured and caused to be mounted in return, and the cost paid and 
exacted in warfare. 
But not only the military force made possible by modem technology 
works against our being able to achieve the control of warfare by aiming 
at modest ends, but also the endless restless aspiration of the human 
spirit, which displays its want of heaven even in-the towering attempts 
at grandeur and wickedness with which history is replete. Moreova, 
ends and means interpenetrate; and this can be as well read in the other 
direction: limited (or unlimited) means or weapons are available and 
resolved to be used, and therefore limited (or &ted) political objec- 
tives may be thought to be proper gods in war. ~alculative morality &d 
politics cannot dispense with exhortations to people to adopt only lim- 
ited goals, and therefore it must rely upon a revival of this aspect of the 
moral tradition of civilized warfare. 
At the same time there is need for a re-creation, in both thought and 
feeling, of the moral tradition of civilized warfare as to the right conduct 
of war and the moral limitation to be placed upon means. Surely, the 
immunity of noncombatants from indimbinate, -direct attack may- come 
again to  govern the consciences of men as readily or with as grkat im- 
probabilit>. as they will set limits to the political objectives thgr pursue. 
It would ill behoove churchmen, in this land that so dramatically over- 
stepped this moral limit, not to follow the lead Mr. Kennan has given. 
For, rightly understood, his is not a rejection of calculation in its proper 
place, nor a neo-pacifism based on a new religious absolutism inserted 
into politics where it is alien, but a reconstruction of the ancient theory 
of "justifiedn warfare, which always supposed that war for the wrong 
ends and war conducted contrary to the natural (rational) law of war 
as a just barely human enterprise (however immoral means may be cal- 
culated to be required by political objectives) was not so to be engaged 
in by either just or good Christian men. 
Postscripts 
A REPLY BY MR. LEFEVER: 
I have profited much by the helpful criticism from Dean Bennett and Mr. 
Ramsey and I agree with much of what each has said. Since I am criti- 
cized for things I omitted, let me say some of them here, although 
it seems redundant for a Christian to refirm that he hates war and de- 
sires peace, justice and liberty. 
Thanks to technology we are living in world of unprecedented dangers. 
The threat of a catastrophically destructive war is the most urgent chal- 
lenge confronting mankind. The United States faces an enemy with the 
capacity to devastate our country in a massive surprise attack. We have 
a similar capacity. 
In this increasingly perilous world the chief goal of U. S. foreign policy 
is to defend our national security, and the values represented by that 
security, by means which will frustrate further Communist aggression 
without initiating, provoking or inviting general nuclear war. To do this 
we need a balanced defense establishment capable of deterring general 
war and of throwing back local assaults without using strategic nuclear 
weapons. 
At the same time we must make every reasonable effort to mitigate the 
arms race. Proper arms control measures will contribute to international 
military stability and will enhance the security of both sides. We should 
work unceasingly for a sound agreement with the Soviets. In the ab- 
sence of such an international agreement, there are significant steps the 
United States can take unilaterally to lower the risk of nuclear war. In 
building our defenses, for example, we should seek to avoid a provoca- 
tive posture. This would make us appear less dangerous to the Soviet 
Union and might evoke a less menacing posture on her part. Arms con- 
trol is a complex problem. I would support a massive-forgive the word- 
research effort to explore the many facets of this questionm~~ 41.. -7k~4pa~ 1 
Every decent person wants a world free from the slaughter or &6 in- 
nocent. We also want a world where men can walk erect without being 
bludgeoned into submission by a tyrant. At certain points in history 
peoples and their leaders must choose between the exercise of military 
force and submission to tyranny. A gross tyranny, which itself may lead 
to gross slaughter, is hardly to be preferred to the heavy burden of 
maintaining a defense posture designed to hold back tyranny and deter 
war. If history is a guide, even a limited military action is to be pre- 
ferred to an externally imposed tyranny. 
But this does not answer the moral dilemma of a statesman who must 
choose between resisting tyranny by means which may lead to general 
nuclear war and submission to tyranny which, through the passage of 
time, may be moderated. Bertrand Russell notwithstanding, a statesman 
will never be confronted with a simple choice of being Red or dead. He 
will always confront a tragic choice, because finite human beings cannot 
fully foresee the good and evil which flow from alternative decisions. 
I did not attempt to play down "the consequences of war," as Dean 
Bennett suggests, but to play up the necessity of calculation to formulate 
policies which will make nuclear war less likely. Nor have I reduced 
ethics to calculation, as Mr. Ramsey implies. 
A moral act always involves at least four elements: a point of refer- 
ence which transcends the situation (e.g., God's will for men), an as- 
sessment of the resources available to the actor, a calculation between 
resources and goals in light of the transcendent reference, and-finally- 
decision. Bad calculation leads to the surrender of our values. Good cal- 
culation preserves our values as fully as possible under the tragic cir- 
cumstances in which we must act. This is hardly contextual ethics, or 
even Mr. Ramsey's "future-facing calculation of consequences." 
One sentence in my essay bothered several readers, in part because 
of its ambiguous language. It has to do with genetic damage. Let me 
write it as I meant it. Genetic damage resulting from tests or from nu- 
clear war (or fiom both tests and war) is well within the range of what 
a civilized society is prepared to tolerate. This is a simple statement of 
fact. Many societies have tolerated much more suffering. At present X 
number of babies are born with damage due to natural radiation. If the 
radiation were doubled in heavy fallout areas because of general nuclear 
war, the number of babies with radiation-caused birth defects would pre- 
sumably be doubled. *Any injury is always an individual tragedy,* but 
doubling the number of damaged babies, or even tripling the number, is 
a tragedy that society can endure, can tolerate, especially if the alterna- 
tive is thought to be possible surrender to an evil regarded by the great 
majority of its citizens as far more sinister. 
Dean Bennett's implication that my ethics are worse than Communist 
ethics because I am willing to "sadce  future generations for a sup- 
posed benefit to people now living" is diflbicult to comprehend. Neither 
statesmen nor moralists can see very far into the future. The fabric of 
history is woven on one loom and we cannot make sharp distinctions be- 
tween yesterday, today and tomorrow. History is a tangled web of cause 
and effect. Every policy or act has many unforeseen consequences which 
cannot be escaped or wished away. 
We are called upon to act for the present generation without doing 
things which clearly doom a future generation. If we succeed in prevent- 
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ing a general nuclear war without inviting Communist expansion, we are 
doing well by both the present and the future. It is possible that the 
unilateral cessation of nuclear tests by the United States, undertaken to 
"benefit future generations," will do more harm to both the present gem 
eration and to generations yet unborn than alternative policies would do. 
I repeat: "A policy designed to save ten thousand persons from pos- 
sible future death by radioactivity which had the actual effect of in- 
viting the death of ten million persons or the enslavement of a hundred 
million persons today could hardly be called morally responsible or po- 
litically wise." 
Limited space permits only one additional observation to be made from 
among the many which a re-reading of the articles in this series has 
produced. 
Hillel the Elder once described the act of taking a bath as a pious a&* 
When his disciples expressed their amazement at this seeming blasphemy, 
he pointed out that washing the body is to care for the image of God in 
which man is created. 
It would appear that what we most need in our contemporary discus- 
sions of peace and war is to regain this Biblical respect for the sanctity 
of the body, for the creaturelineSs of crass matter, and to take down a peg 
or two our vaunted concern with "spirituality." 
War has, of course, always involved the desecration of the Image-of 
the corporeal image of the killed, not to speak of the spiritual image of 
the killers. At this time, however, an even more fundamental Greek con- 
tempt for the material world is implicitly being reasserted. Walter Millis 
go; so far as to speak of war as one of the ugly but morally neutral facts 
of life on a par with pain, pestilence, and natural disaster. Surely-to use 
terms proposed several decades ago by the great Kafka interpreter Max 
Brod in an important book, Paganimr, ChrWunrty, Juda-this is to 
confuse "noble suffering" und& conditions which cannot be humanly 
remedied with "ignoble suffering'' which can and, therefore, should be 
remedied. One can almost hear the silent premise underlying such a con- 
fusion willingly accepted: "But this is only physical existen&. There are 
higher values, such as freedom, justice, etc." Of course there are. But 
these are values not for angels as for human beings of flesh and blood* 
The most disturbing political application of this contempt for matter 
is the moral and social identification of Communism with Nazism. Even 
John Cogley, of all people, accepts this concept. Because of our memory 
of the danger of Nazism we can no longer countenance pacifism, he be- 
lieves. Let us for the moment assume that Nazism refuted pacifism. Let 
us also disregard the fact that to millions of people it was the Red Army 
that opened the gates of Terezin and Oczwiecem. It still remains true 
that, whereas Nazism was the savage rebellion against Western culture, 
dialectical materialism is a protest against an occidental distortion of the 
Bible-gone awry a ~ ~ d  cormpted in Communism, of Murse, but neverthe- 
less remaining within the stream fed by the fountains of Jerusalem and 
Athens. 
To forget this all-important distinction is to fall for the game of the 
neo-fascists. But the contemners of matter are profoundly pre-disposed 
to embrace this mistake: is not Communism materialism, and is not ma- 
terialism the worship of the devil? Therefore, to them Communism is 
satanism and must be fought accordingly. To us Nazism was the au- 
thentic spiritual God and Magog and different from Communism; it had 
to be fought differently. 
The ha1 result of this excessive anti-materialism is a peculiar quiet- 
istic stance toward war and an activist one toward Communism. We must 
do everything in our power to stem and defeat Communism, and we 1 
must wait until in some mysterious way, in the absence of 
pressure from us to this end, war will have eliminated itself. Stephen Cary 
is certainly right: without the pull on the 'left" by at least a minority of 
pacifists the "liberalsn will only feel the pull from the "right," and they 
will incxeasingly become that wing of militarism which has a slightly 
bad conscience. This is the least service that pacifism can and must 
render today. 
MR. MILLIS: 
The year and more which has passed since my contribution to wo~Zd- 
dew's series has suggested to me no reason for changing it. The crowded 
record has, however, tended to confirm the two main points I tried to 
make: the great dif6culty of dealing with problems of war and interna- 
tional relations in moral terms, and the likelihuod that practical solu- 
tions will somehow be achieved with no particular aid from the mord- 
ists. The difficult passages involving the disarmament negotiations and 
summit meeting have not been smoothed by the moralistic appeals of 
the statesmen-neither by Wrushchev's moralistic denunciations of crim- 
inal and illegal "aggression" nor by Eisenhower's righteous insistence that 
he would go anywhere and do anydung to secure a "just and lasting 
peace." 
The ethical and legal justifications advanced for the espionage over- 




iderable bewilderment. The whole episode reminds one of Woodrow , - 
Wilson's attempts to deal, in sternly moralistic terms, with a new tech- 
nical development-the German submarine-which simply could not be 
fitted into existing amcepts of the ethics or the international law of war. - 
Like the U-boat, the U-2 was a technical development which did not fit 
what preexisting rules there were, and our people fumbled with it as I 
badly as the Germans in the First War fumbled their arguments for the 
But the practical results appear to be happier. Wilson scorned the 
German argumenk and the result was a war which ironically codinned 
the German case and left unrestricted submarine war an accepted ele- ' 1  I 
ment in military technology. Khrushchev has poured scorn and contumely ' 
upon our arguments for the U-2; but he has retired from the summit I . 
leaving most feeling that war is even less probable than it was before. 
If his performmce was verbally brutal and our own diplomatically less ' 
than brilliant, the episode instills a greater confidence in the capcify ' 
of statesmanship on both sides to thread a practical way through the great 
perils surrounding us-perils in large part generated by the fiercely mor- . 
&tic attitudes brought, on both sides of the Iron Curtain, to the prob- , I 
military technology. 
Looking back with a year's perspective at this wZduiao series, it seems 
to me that the kind of choice faced by the Church in world &airs is 
even more sharply etched in 1960 than it was in 1959. The power politics 
of the Cold War, dictating overflights, mutual security pacts, and sup- 
port of anti-Communist regimes, however oppressive, have brought disas- I. 
ter in their wake. Contrary policies aimed at rapprochement and involving I , 
goodwill tours and human interchange have as sharply produced op- 
' I  
posite and happier results. These developments underline the fact that 
if we would draw forth the best from people, we must expect the best 1 1 1 
om them rather than the worst. I 
This concept is inherent in the Christian ethic, which is the only 
plumbline the Church can use if it is to be the Church. It cannot calcu- - 
late whether it is relevant, but only what will make it relevant. Which, 1 I 
translated into the practical terms of U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations, suggests that 
the Churches' calculative role is to weigh American policy in terms of ' , 
what will best lift up t h e  forces in the Soviet Union that are good, and ' 
weaken those that are evil. In so doing it will be contributing not to ' " 
victory in the Cold War, but to its honorable end, which should be the . I 8 
of all men (d good will. I 
I .  
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This process of change, on the other hand, cannot be encouraged by 
the doctrine of deterrence, which will necessarily produce a response in 
kind, and strengthen the hands of the least desirable military and Party 
elements in the Soviet Union. A more unfortunate development could 
hardly be imagined. Those, therefore, who expect the emergence of either 
a climate for negotiation or a stable military environment out of the con- 
struction of such a nuclear house of cards exhibit an optimism for which 
there would appear to be scant grounds. Mr. Lefever suggests that there 
be important factors . . . which . . . make for restraint." So there 
may, but there may not be too, and the world won't get a seomd chance 
if there is even one instance where the restraints are absent. These are 
perilously high stakes. n! i 
And what are the demands of deterrence at home? It should be clear 
to all that power does not deter unless the enemy believes we are pre- 
pared to employ it. We must therefore be prepared to employ it. Nuclear 
war must be made thinkable to the American people, and rational men 
are now engaged in drawing up rational plans for nuclear wars to be 
fought at various theoretical levels, the least destructive of which posits 
fifty million American casualties. They are calling for America to spend 
countless more billions in going underground and stepping up missile 
production, as necessary components to making detemence dective by 
showing the Russians we mean business. This logic is unassailable, once 
the concept of deterrence is accepted, but if America is really ready to 
go down this road in the name of defending Christian values, then Or- 
well's 1984 is indeed upon us. 
I ask again, therefore, whether the Church can continue to support a 
doctrine that inhibits the emergence of new and moderate elements in 
the Soviet Union, drives the world toward an even more finely honed 
Me-edge of terror, and involves us in a commitment to wage nuclear 
war if neessary. My answer is: No. 
WAR AND THE ABSOLUTISTS 
Kenneth W. Thornpaon 
No problem facing contemporary world leaders tests political intelligence 
and moral imagination more severely than the issue of nuclear weapons. 
The awesome question of what is a viable armaments policy perplexes 
men no less in 1980 than it did in 1945. What are responsible govern- 
ments to do with instruments of lethal destruction? What programs can 
international institutions devise that will broaden the narrow spectnun of 
security tlmt nations have enjoyed since World War II? Who is pre- 
pared to gambIe on another's restraint with growing stockpiles of ever 
more deadly weapons? If there is no security in national weakness can 
states find safety in national strength? If so, what has happened to 
criteria of national power when thermonuclear devices can in fatal strikes 
wipe out whole populations, armies and industrial potentials? How is 
the moralist to h d  his way between the shoals of a heedless compassion 
that asks too much of cuUective virtue and a harsh cynicism that de- 
nies the prospect of national suicide and mutual annihilation? What 
are the points of convergence of justice and security and how can they 
be kept in balance when technology continually alters crucial elements 
in the equation? 
To akroach the armaments field through a set of bafEing questions is 
hardly r w g ,  for no other realm of international relationships more 
desperately requires c1earcut answers and solutions. We reassure one 
another that reascmable men can find a way out of the present impasse if 
they but contrive more imaginative policies. Those who admit stalemate 
or protracted uncertainty in politid, economic, moral or social d c t s  
instinctively prefer more precise designs and overall blueprints for the 
armaments problem. For example, many who see no abatement in political 
tensions between Moscow and Washington a&m that one action or an- 
other will assure an early end to the arms race, for failing this all men 
will perish. Disarmament commends itself as a sensible way out when 
the problem of Berlin, Formosa or Cuba prove insoluble. To this ap- 
proach most lend assent up to the point our policymakers cany new pro- 
grams into the international arena. When their efforts fail, however, we 
look to exp1anatim that question their good will, motivation, or intelli- 
gence, but rarely the stubborn quality of the problem itself. Fifteen years 
of disappointmeat and htratian in negotiating an end to the arms race 
are apparently inconclusive for the vast majority of dedicated observers. b '  
Yet if men like General George C. Marshall or Prime Minister Winston 
S. Churchill had been trusted, we should have devoted greater energy and 
attention to preparing to live for a generation or more with the terrifying 
risks of nuclear destruction. It must be recalled that a handful of wise 
leaders worried that demands for an end to armed tension showed little 
sign of realization without a more basic shift in the international climate. 
Believing this, their prescription required more intellectual and moral 
effort than most moralists or cynics are prone to accept. The notion that 
"states arm to parley" is at me and the same time offensive to pacifists 
and extreme militarists whose diagnosis is inevitably more convincing 
and satisfying to broad sectors of public opinion. Furthermore, when any 
problem as intractable as the armaments problem resists every attempt at 
solution, more radical approaches take the field. If warfare persists, men 
seek to outlaw it. When great power negotiations break down, the public 
at large demands that "people speak to pe~ple." The unquenchable faith 
in reason by which Western civilization has advanced generates the be- 
lief that no issue that divides men can long remain outside the boundaries 
of genuine understanding. Failure to solve a problem must therefore seek 
a scapegoat, whether imperfect institutions, ill-prepared negotiators, or 
laggard policymakers. Someone must have been asleep at the switch, for 
otherwise reason and humanity would surely have freed us from the 
dread crisis. 
I know that any analysis which places the accent on elements of the 
armaments problem that up to now have denied success to serious and 
responsible leaders is bound to evoke hustility and deep distrust. Critics 
will ask if the observer tends to leave millions of helpless men and 
women to their fate. What has happened to his sense of moral revulsion 
to war, to a renunciation of the acts and means of violence, or to the 
compeIling lesson that man should love, not seek to destroy, his brother? 
Moreover, doesn't the student of international conflict move unconscious- 
ly and imperceptibly from describing the facts of international life as he 
sees them to a posture of belaboring those who condemn him for his 
callousness and immorality? Then too, the further risk is always with him 
that he develop a vested interest in the status quo with all its tragic 
failures and shattered hopes. The more he observes the cancerous state of , 
affairs brought about by such profound divisions as the rift between East ' 
and West, the more he comes to accept it, at least in the short run and 
barring fundamental changes, as a permanent condition to be relieved, 
temporarily alleviated, but never fully eliminated or cured. I 
Yet the moral risks of facing reality cannot excuse the diplomatist any 
more than the doctor from accepting the distressing burdens that are 
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inherent in his task. If all patients were free of disease at all times, the 
doctor*s place could appropriately be filled by someone else with other 
training and skills. If the international stage were not plagued by rivalry, 
distrust and suspicion, negotiators who have learned to take conflict in 
stride would quickly become obsolete. Incidentally, no diplomatist worthy 
of the name believes that warfare is inevitable. It is conflict and rivalry, 
particularly among those who contend for influence and authority, that is 
taken for granted, and the search is unremitting for ways and means to 
limit rivalries and prevent the struggle for power from crossing over into 
open strife and war. The vocation and the commitment of the negotiator 
compel him to believe that war is not inevitable. When the inflammation 
caused by tension and rivalry grows too intense, he must apply a poultice 
to relieve the infection until time and circumstances can restore health to 
the body politic. If he were to act as if the infection were imaginary or 
could be "reasoned" away, he should have failed in his calling, how- 
ever humane and civilized his motives might be. The doctor can hardly 
assume that health will supplant disease once and for all; neither can 
the diplomat proceed as if virtue were obliterating sinfulness or coopera- 
tion had superceded codict. 
I accept the fact that for any sensitive conscience the need to recog- 
nize the dual reality of good and evil can be profoundly distressing. Few 
liberd Christians and humanists deny the reality of imperfect virtue and 
they labor faithfully in social reform and aid to the oppressed to reduce, 
not eliminate, human suffering. They accept the necessity of charity 
even within blatantly oppressive and unjust social systems whose pur- 
poses they must ultimately condemn. Here liberals and particularly pa- 
cifists link the "incompatible" forces of an ethic of love and coexistence 
with tyrannical regimes. Because I believe they are right in striving to 
bring aid and comfort to victims of an unjust political order even at the 
expense of strengthening that order, I am puzzled by their austere re- 
jection of ethical pragmatism in confronting the armaments problem. 
Surely limited war is morally superior to total war and the Cold War is 
to be preferred to a shooting war. Yet moral relativists who see some 
justice in the most tyrannical regimes become moral absolutists in the 
claim that there is "no other course for the Church but the final rejec- 
tion of war as an instrument for achieving justice." I would not ask men 
to form an unholy alliance with evil nor justify what is wrong, but I 
would only hope they might consider that cooperation with evil in the 
interests of the good cannot be defended in political and social rela- 
tions and utterly condemned in the military realm. 
I suspect the source of this illusion rests in the belief that men can 
draw an absolute distinction between strategies of violence and non-vio- 
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lence. Non-violent resistance is often equated with the pure gospel of love. 
Sometimes indeed, it may be morally superior to violence. Yet the Holy 
Gospel has nothing to say about strategems of nm-violence through 
which one group seeks to impose its will on another. The seeds of evil 
group themselves around a man's desire and necessity, as he sees it, to 
have his way with someone else, restricting thereby the self-fulfillment 
of human personality. The basis of wrong-doing would seem to be the 
encroachment of one will on another and the denial of self-realization 
and individuality. Violence is a more egregious form of this evil but is 
not fundamentally a thing apart. 
I fear moral absolutism in the face of the nuclear problem partly be- 
cause the resources of Christian ethics are so desperately needed in the 
proximate decisions of military policy. I must aeee  with the statement 
of the British Council of Churches that "restraint is a major Christian 
objective? Yet if Christians can only condemn military programs, as some 
have traditionally denounced all forms of politics, who will defend that 
objective? Who will speak for reason, self-limitation and restricting the 
build-up of defenses to proportions that will deter and inhibit a reckless 
enemy without endless striving to surpass him in every weapon within 
a vast armory of dest~u&veness? Who will hold the reins on policies 
of unconditional surrender and programs aimed at liquidating an op- 
ponent? Who will pursue the goal of limiting conflict in scope and char- 
acter? If Christians or Jews restrict themselves to condemning and de- 
nouncing all politics and military measures, they leave to others, as we 
must sadly confess has too often been the case, the pursuit of Judeo- 
Christian objectives like restraint. I say this not to condemn those who 
hold honestly and sincerely to another viewpoint but because this issue 
seems fundamental to me, as apparently it also does to the British Council 
of Churches. 
If moral certainty in the control and elimination of nuclear weapons ex- 
ceeds the wit and attainment of man, no one who would responsibly 
serve his nation and the world can abandon the search for more viable 
policies for limited problems. The irony of the nuclear age is that all-out 
was has lost its inner logic but no major power across the vast chasm 
of mutual distrust can afford to be the first to found its policies upon this 
premise. However, the first level at which moral compulsion properly 
takes the stage is at the point where man's necessity to control and elimi- 
nate warfare conflicts with his insufllciency to do so. Those who assert that 
the practical man must "accept war in the abstract as a fact of life" are 
doubtless correct as are those who point out that most choices the states- 
man makes are practical ones at several stages removed from the moral 
issue. Yet moral man faced with mankind's extinction has an obligation 
by virtue of common humanity to resist in every practical way the un- 
folding of a chain of events leading to disaster. Moral responsibility for 
others no less than himself requires him to act with moral and political 
discrimination to prevent war from breaking out, to restrict its spread 
once it erupts, and to bring it to an end as promptly and decisively as 
possible. Moral discrimination is an unending process and those who 
would restrict it to outlawing war and the instruments of warfare con- 
h e  it within too narrow limits. The compulsion to seek moral distinc- 
tions across a wide spectrum of war and peace is generated by a morality 
comprehensive enough to embrace both means and ends. 
Secondly, the moralist for these reasons is entitled to speak not merely 
about war in the abstract but about particular wars and the military and 
political conditions that either increase the likelihood of war or threaten 
to cany a struggle beyond the point of self-defense or legitimate national 
or international interests. We know enough about the tendencies of men 
and nations, so we can assert that great weakness has almost always in- 
vited expansion and aggression by those possessing great strength. .The 
duty of statesmen is to reduce the temptation for dynaxnic expansicmist 
movements to spread their idumce and their cause. At the same time, 
under &cumstances of present-day technology, nations can ill-afford to 
build defense systems capable alone of wars of last recourse. Despite 
repeated claims that conventional wars had been rendered obsolete, out- 
breaks since World War I1 have all been wnventimd in nature. Mili- 
tary codid and the threat of conflict in Korea, Hungary, Suez, Vietnam 
and Lebanon have followed the conventional pattern. Nor is the argu- 
ment convincing that the West has no practical alternative. A leading 
military analyst writes: "Many of the assumptions regarding the im- 
possibility of conventional defense and of the 'bordes' of Communist 
manpower, are either fallacious or exaggerated. Both in total available 
manpower and in its industrial potential the free world still is superior." 
Neither national necessity nor military logic excuses American diplo- 
matic and intellectual leaders from considering principles defining the 
limits of military preparation and conduct. An armaments program aimed 
at overwhelming nuclear superiority must be questioned both on mili- 
tary and ethical grounds, for the purpose of thermonuclear strength is to 
confront an adversary "with the certainty of severe retaliation, sufficient to 
make the adventure too costly." The goal under present-day conditions 
cannot be organizing the means of victory since "the real defeat is the 
war itself, for it involves a common fate which will be visited on all who 
have anything to do with it." Yet reasonable prudence in establishing 
limited nuclew strength may prove a deterrent to those who might 
otherwise dare to use weapons they monopolized. Even a great and hu- 
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mane people succumbed to such a temptation, and we are constrained 
to speculate over what course we might have followed at Hiroshima if 
others had possessed the bomb. 
The United States cannot afford to reject cavalierly "the principle of: 
proportion." Whatever the difficulties of enforcing restraint, the ancient , 
truth holds good that grave injustices may not be repressed by means'*,' 
bringing greater injustice than the perpetuation of the injustice. I am '5 
not convinced that a reexamination of the classic texts on the conditions ,j 
of a just war or of defensive wars is outmoded in our time. The great i 1  
publicists of the past were more inclined than some of our latter-day I '  
international lawyers to view law and justice in context. They searched ' I  
their souls and the practice of states to ascertain when and how states. , 
and princes could be expected to keep their commitments. Circumstances 1 
led them to write less of enforcement systems and more of conditions of !ii 
self-interest and mutual trust. They talked of levels and orders of jus- ' I . .  
tice and were not above accepting the compromises absolute justice was 1: 
compelled to make if a tolerable order was to be preserved. I find in : 
such writings and in much of the historic Catholic literature, partly be- , 
cause its precepts are rooted both in heaven and earth, a greater sense,;' 
of moral discrimination and attention to proximate orders of justice than tr'i 
in the writings of many Christian or Jewish perfectionists. 
A brilliant philosopher viewing the contemporary scene asks, "Where 
are the ethical principles to fix the appropriate limits?" If he had broad- ,;i 
ened his question to read "where are the ethical and political principlesm+ 
he might have obtained an answer. Any system of limitation must serve 1 
the national interests of both parties. We are told that an armaments \ 
agreement will be self-enforcing if compliance serves such interests better ,, 
than evasion or violation. The underpinnings of every international ar- ' 
rangement are, of course, moral in character. There must be a semblance 
of mutual trust. The basic problem in East-West relations has been and 
remains the conspicuous absence of such trust. If this trust is to be 
created, however, it must grow from the discovery of mutual interests 
so overpowe~g as to transcend sharp ideological cleavages. Do Russians 
and Americans have a common interest in attacking the problem of 
wheat-borne virus? Do they share a mutual interest in restricting the 
spread and diffusion of atomic weapons among the smaller powers? 
Should they both cut off the risk of contaminating the atmosphere by end- 
ing nuclear tests? Do they have an equal stake in restraining buoyant and 
reckless powers who on ideological or political grounds would plunge 
the world into a deathly atomic holocaust? The truth is that answers 
will come as part of a slow, gradual process the direction of which can- 
not be measured by the collapse of the Paris talks any more than by the !I 
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of Geneva or Camp David. No one cab foresee the fu- 
predictable turns and pathways. Yet history yields to hu- 
initiative and evil may yet spawn good as those of us who examine 
onal experience must hasten to admit. 
Modern man could look to an uncertain future with more assurance if - 
provided surer intellectual and moral footing. On one side, ' #  
we are endlessly disposed to downgrade the awesome burdens of po- ' 
Iitical leadership and the tragic choices that political reason imposes on . 
the statesman. In his heart, he would prefer freedom to slavery, peace to ' ,  
war and love to power, yet in his official duties he is forever reduced to 
I I I 1, 
accepting the lesser evil (or greater good). Because the main stdl of his 
political calculation, his actions carry a bad name. From all - - 
sides, friends and critics call on him to pursue justice, but because he is 
est broker of conflicting moral claims, he ends by in some ., . 1 
all. He must gauge the political consequences of 
and with Lincoln accept as his guide the words: "I do the , ' 
ow how, the very best I can, and I mean to keep doing so ' , 
If the end brings me out all right, what is said against me 
won't amount to anything. If the end brings me out wrong, ten angels a l I  I 
swearing I was right would make no difference.* In this sense, a po- l 
litical ethic is -future-facing and good intentions or noble manners will . 
statesman for moral or political failure. 
. 
Yet it also remains true that every political calculation has its moral , , ' #  , 
omponents, and we remember as our greatest statesman those for whom I  
I  .I tireless conscience preserved the tension between the practical and the 1 1  
od. Prudence stands between a judgment of present reality and some II I I 
objective good. Incidentally, both cynics and perfectionists !I , I 
to undervalue the M scope of moral conduct inspired by -" 
tension between these two poles. Thus when a distinguished pacifist - 
olar writes: 'Christian conscience in wartime seems to have chiefly , , 
e effect . . . of making Christians do reluctantly what military neces- b 8  ' - 
," he closes his eyes to a range of conduct many of us have 1 # I  
: charity to helpless victims of the struggle, aid to the s u f f e ~ g  
e wounded often at great personal risk, and, following the con- ; 
ct, a lifetime of dedication to peace as the supreme goal. I would sug- , 1 
1, t a profound concern, often unartidated, with the conduct and ' 
of war runs deeper in many sensitive hearts than this indict- I n  I n  
ts of political ethics are correct in calling us back I I 
"the moral tradition of civilized warfare" and to recreating the mili- I ' 
,' .I 
and material circumstances that may foster it. We have need to re- ; 
on right and wrong conduct in war as in peace. I suspect the United " 
8 8 
I 
I  ' .  
I  
Nations, particularly in parts of the world where suspicion of Whstemers 
runs rampant, can be a limiting and restraining force. Yet given the im- 
mense hazards of the clash between the great powers who hold in their 
hands powers of mutual destruction, we should also have, with Lincoln, 
a sense of throwing ourselves on the mercy of Providence* In the end 
rection of concepts of a "just" war. 
this may prove a greater support than political calculation or the resur-w 
Appendix 
FOREIGN POLICY AND CHRISTIAN CONSCIENCE 
George F. Kennan 
I should like to say at the outset that questions of method in foreign 
policy seem to me to be generally a much more fitting subject for Chris- 
tian concern than questions of purpose. It is very dScult for us to know 
which of the specific undertakings of government in foreign affairs might 
have Christian significance and which might not If there is any one thing 
that is plain about international statesmanship, it is the extreme difEidty 
of establishing in advance the relationship between cause and effect- 
of gauging the likely results of one's own acts. 
The English historian Herbert Buttedield has shown us with great 
brilliance, and so has our own Reinhold Niebuhr, the irony that seems 
to rest on the relationship between the intentions of statesmen and the 
results they achieve. I can testdy from personal experience that not only 
can one never how,  when one takes a far-reaching decision in foreign 
policy, precisely what the consequences are going to be, but almost never 
do these oonsequences fully coincide with what one intended or expected. 
This does not absolve the statesman of his responsibility for trying to find 
the measures most suitable to his purpose, but it does mean that he is 
best off when he is guided by firm and sound principle instead of de- 
pending exclusively on his own farsightedness and powers of calculation. 
And if he himself finds it hard to judge the consequences of his acts, how 
can the individual Christian onlooker judge them? 
All this is quite different when we come to method. Here, in a sense, 
one can hardly go m n g .  The government cannot fully lmow what it is 
doing, but it can always know how it is doing it; and it can be as sure 
that good methods will be in some way useful as that bad ones will be 
in some way pernicious. A government can pursue its purpose in a patient 
and conciliatory and understanding way, respecting the interests of 
& 
This condensation of an address delivered by Mr. Kennan at Princeton Theo- 
logical Seminary first appeared in The Atlantic MontMy for May, 1959 and is 
reprinted here with permission of the author and The Atlantic Monthly. 
others and infusing its behavior with a high standard of decency and 
honesty and humanity, or it can show itself petty, exacting, devious, and 
self-righteous. If it behaves badly, even the most worthy of purposes will 
be apt to be polluted; whereas sheer good manners will bring same meas- 
ure of redemption to even the most &sastrous undertaking. The Christian 
citizen will be on sound ground, therefore, in looking sharply to the 
methods of his government's diplomacy, even when he is uncertain about 
its purposes. 
In the fabric of internaticmal life, there are a great many questions 
that have no certain Christian significance at all. T k  represent conficts 
between those elements of secular motivation which are themselves with- 
out apparent Christian meaning: commercial interests, prestige considera- 
tions, fears, and what not. I do not think we can conclude that it mat- 
ters greatly to God whether the free trade area or the Common Market 
prevails in Europe, whether the British fish or do not fish in Icelandic 
territorial waters, or even whether Indians or Pakistani run Kashmir. It 
might matter, but it is hard for us, with our limited vision, to know. 
But these are all questions which reflect the normal frictions between 
peace-loving nations. How about the issues of the Cold War? How about 
colonialism? How about aid to the underdeveloped areas? How about the 
United Nations as an institution? How about the atom? Are not Christian 
values involved in our attitude toward these questions? 
In its internal policies, the state can create a decent human atmos- 
phere, in which the individual has the maximum possibility for grappling 
in a hopeful and cawtructive way with the moral problems of personal 
life. Or it can, as we have seen in the examples of Hitler and Stalin and 
the Chinese Communists, strike out on the most appalling lines of vicious- 
ness and cruelty, deliberately fostering a real sickness of the human spirit 
and inculcating on people's minds, for its own purposes, suspicion, terror, 
callousness, and the habit d bmtality-creating conditions dreadfully 
advase to the success of the Christian cause. Christianity cannot be in- 
different to the existence of such doctrines and methods; and whatever 
prevents their spread and their triumph on a world scale serves, it seems 
to me, a Christian purpose. 
But I do not think this means that every measure that is damaging to 
international Communism is necessarily good and every measure that is 
acceptable to a Communist government is necessarily bad. The world is 
not that simple. Our competition with Moscow is not the only significant 
reality of internaticmal &airs. Our policim, furthermore, must take into 
account the interests of the peoples under Communist rule as well as 
those of thek governments. Again, we have the question of method and 
the fact that not even the greatest conviction of righteousness in our 
I 
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purposes absolves us from the obligation of decency in method. If we 
allow ourselves to copy our adversary's methods as a means of combat- 
ing him, we may have lost the battle before we start; for this is, after all- 
what is most essentially at stake. 
Furthermore, we must not make the mistake of regarding intema- 
tional Communism as a static, unchanging quantity in the pattern of 
world realities. While the full-blown totalitarian state in all its unnatural, 
nightmarish horror is certainly an abomination in the sight of God, one 
cannot say this of the conservative authoritarian state which has been 
the norm of Western society in the Christian era. And we must not forget 
that it is in this direction that the Soviet government, as distinct from 
the Chinese Communist government, has been rapidly evolving since 
Stalin's death. Its gravitation in this direction has not been final or de- 
cisive, but it has not been negligible. The mere fact that the most char- 
acteristic feature of totalitarian horror, the punishment of whole cate- 
gories of people for abstract or preventive reasons, has been abolished 
shows how far the Russians have wme since Stalin's day. 
Now between democracy and traditional authoritarianism there are 
still ditferences, but they are relative and do not present clear-cut issues. 
The authoritarian regime, despite its origins and its sanctions, often rests 
I on a wide area of popular acceptance and reflects popular aspirations in 
important degree. In democratic countries, on the other hand, such things 
as the operations of lobbies and political parties and the inevitable con- 
trol of nominations by small groups of people tend to reduce the ideal 
representativeness of government and to make it hard to view the politi- 
cal process as much more than a negative expression of the popular will. 
And if you consider, as I do, that the value of a demmtic  society in 
the Christian sense depends not just on the fact of its enjoying certain 
rights and liberties but on the nature of the use made of them, then I 
think you have to raise questions about w American society of this day. 
These questions do not need to make us lose hope or hang our heads, 
but they should cause us to be cautious in drawing conclusions about the 
merit in God's eyes of any particular form of society. 
All these considerations lead me to feel that, while Christian values 
often are involved in the issues of Ametican conflict with Soviet power, 
we cannot conclude that everytbmg we want automatically rdects the 
purpose of God and everythmg the Russians want reflects the purpose of 
the devil. The pattern is complex, fuzzy, and unstable. We must look 
sharply at each individual issue before we jump to conclusions. We must 
bear in mind that there are things we do not know and cannot know. We 
must concede the possibility that there might be some areas of conflict 
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with a s m e  of pity and disgust for both parties, and others m which He 
might even consider us to be wrong. 
So much for the Cold War. How about colonialism? Nobody seems to 
suggest any more, I notice, that God might conceivably be on the side 
of the metropolitan power, despite the fact that of the two parties in- 
volved it is often the mother country that represents the Christian society 
, 
and the colonial people the pagan me. The assumption usually encoun- 
tered today is that any form of foreign rule is necessarily oppressive and 
worse than any form of indigenous rule. The next assumption is that any 
anti-colonial effort is therefore automatically good in the Christian sense 
-that self-determination, in short, is a Christian purpose. 
I am d d n t  that for such assumptions there is not a shred of justifi- 
caticm. The e r d m  of the edifice of modern colonialism was not a moral 
act or a series of m o d  acts but the response to obvious historical con- 
ditions and necessities. It was a phenomenon occasioned by the fact that 
industrialism burst forth in Europe and North America more than a hun- 
dred years earlier than it did in other parts of the globe and thus pro- 
duced huge and sudden disparities in physical and administrative power. 
This called for a politid response, and colonialism was this response. 
We Amdcans were spared a greater participation in it only because of 
aur preoccupation with the development of our own continent-for no 
other reasm. 
Today the colonial relationship has outworn in many instances-though 
by no means all-its original technol~cal and psychological justifica- 
tion. A great part of the colonial system has been liquidated, and another 
part of it is in murse of liquidation. This process could not fail to give 
rise to teosicms of tragic bitterness and difticuIty. In the anatomy of 
these tensions, one will look in vain, as a rule, for any Christian mean- 1 
ing. The resistance to change on the part of the mother country has some- 
times redlected selfishness and shortsightedness, and it has also reflected 
in many cases a genuine sense of responsibility. Conversely, the demand 
for change on the part of the colonial people has sometimes reflected a 
real love of liberty, and it has often been borne by a spirit fiercely 
chauvinistic, full of hatred, undemocratic, and irresponsible. 
Let us, as ChriPtlans, view these resulting conflicts for what they are: 
tragic situations, in which the elements of right and wrong are indis- 
tinguishable to us. Let us remember that insofar as these situations reflect 
racial differences, we ourselves stand before God and the world as one 
of the most amspicuuus examples of the failure to find a satisfactory 
Christian solution to such problems. Let us learn to view this whole sub- 
ject of wlonialism with humility, with detachment, with compassion for 
both sides. Let us not abuse the d d e n c e  of Christ by invoking his 
judgment m e  way or another on situations that were obviously beyond 
the power of mortal man to prevent and are now beyond the power of 
mortal man to liquidate without pain and strife. 
Or take the problems of technical assistance and other forms of aid 
to underdeveloped peoples. Here, too, I must argue against the abso- 
lutes. I can think of no question of Christian doctrine which needs crit- 
ical examination more than the question of what canstitutes charity. 
Even in the personal sense, in the relations between individuals, I often 
wonder whether we do not constantly misinterpret the term and whether 
it does not contain a host of subjective pitfalls. Charity is not giving 
people things which will only encourage them to postpone facing up to 
the necessities under which they are going to have to live in the long 
. I question the handout as a means of bringing any important benefit 
o anyone, even in personal life. How much more complicated, then, is 9" 
the matter of charity between nations. It is difficult to benefit a whole 
nation, as distinct from certain factions and elements in its competitive 
, by anything you do to it from outside which affects its internal 
s of competition. And make no mistake about it: every infusion of 
gn aid has this dect. There are always some who benefit from it 
others whose interests are damaged by it. 
t beyond this, foreign aid, to be really effective as a gesture of 
tian charity, would have to be understood as such a gesture by the 
'ents as well as by the donors. But most foreign peoples do not 
eve that governments do things for selfless and altruistic motives; and 
e do not reveal to them a good solid motive of self-interest for any- 
we do with regard to them, they are apt to invent one. This can 
more sinister one than we ever dreamed of, and their belief in it 
can cause serious confusion in our mutual relations. 
Foreign aid has a place in our foreign policy; but the favorable possi- 
bilities for it are more slender than people generally suppose. The less it 
consists of outright grants, the better. The less we try to clothe it in the 
trappings of disinterested altruism-to view it as Christian charity-the 
more we can show it as a rational extrapolation of our own national in- 
terest, the better understood and the more dective it is going to be 
abroad. 
The sovereign national state, to which so much reverent devotion is 
paid in the various gradations of patriotism and chauvinism that make up 
national feelings, has no foundation in Christian principle, whatever its 
secular justification. Nowhere in Christ's teachings was it suggested that 
mankind ought to be divided into political families of this nature, each 
a law unto itself, each recognizing no higher authority than its own na- 
tional ego, each assuming its interest to be more worthy of service than 
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any other with which it might come into codict. Surely this whole theory 
is an absurdity from the CMstian standpoint. Before we could achieve 
Christian foreign policy we would have to overcome this unlimited ego- 
tism of the sovereign national state and find a higher interest which all 
of us could recognize and serve. 
How about the United Nations? it will be asked. Is this not an institu- 
tion which, insofar as it represents an endeavor to transcend national 
sovereignty, deserves our support as a vehicle of the Christian purpose? 
The UN represents not a supergovernment, not a separate institutional 
personality, but one of a number of forums on which gotrernments com- 
municate with one another. It does not, in reality, transcend the barrier , 
of sovereignty. Its members are governments, not peoples, and such 
slender authority as it sometimes possesses is conferred upon it by these 
governments, each still acting within the sovereign framework. 
There is no particular Christian sanctity lent to decisions taken in the 
United Nations by the fact that they represent the views of a majority of 
gwemments. Little countries are not necessarily mare virtuous or more 
enlightened than big ones; and an international majority does not neces- 
sarily rdect the Christian answer, or even the most wise and courageou 
answer, to anything. 
On the other hand, the UN does represent the germ of something im- 
mensely necessary and immensely hopeful far this endangered world: 
namely, a sense of conscience higher than the national me, a sense of 
the fe11owship of fate by which we are all inmeasingly bound together. 
I cannot conceive of a satisfactory future for humanity that does not 
embrace, and draw its strength fmm, the growth of this consciousness. 
The present UN is the symbol of it. This symbol is stiU weak and tender, 
but it is not insignificant. We must therefore cherish it and guard it, not 
burdening it beyond its strength, not looking to it for the impossible, 
but strengthening it where and when we can, above all in our own 
thoughts and attitudes. JY 
This does not mean that all UN decisions are to be taken as automati 1 
cally right and good. It does not mean that all diplomatic questions 
should be uncritically consigned to the UN, whether or not this is a 
suitable place for their discussion. But it does mean that we should be 
careful and respectful of the organization as such, remembering that I 
if the idea which it symbolizes is ever allowed to depart from internation- 
al life, nothing else can stand between us and the horrors of a wholly 
chaotic world in the atomic age. 
This brings me now to the questions on which I think a Christian 
might, with good conscience, really take a stand. They involve not just 
the national interests of individual governments but rather the interests 
t 
of civilization: the question of war, and the atom, and the other weapons 
of mass destruction. 
I am aware that the institution of war has always represented dilem- 
mas for Christian thought to which no fully satisfactory answer has ever 
been offered. I have, in the past, found myself unable to go along with 
the Quakers in their insistence on a sweeping renunciation of power as 
a factor in international affairs. I do not see the reality of so clear a dis- 
tinction as they draw between domestic affairs and international &airs. 
The Communists have taught us that these two things are intimately 
connected, that civil wars have international implications and that inter- 
national wars have domestic implications everywhere. I am unable there- 
fore to accept the view which condemns coercion in the international 
sphere but tolerates it within the national borders. 
But that we cannot rule out force completely in international affairs 
does not seem to me to constitute a reason for being indifferent to the 
ways in which force is applied-to the moral implications of weapons 
and their uses. It is true that all distinctions among weapons from the 
moral standpoint are relative and arbitrary. Gunpowder was once viewed 
with a horror not much less, I suppose, than are atomic explosives today. 
But who is to say that relative distinctions are not meaningful? I cannot 
help feeling that the weapon of indiscriminate mass destruction goes 
farther than anything the Christian ethic can properly accept. The older 
weapons, after all, were discriminate in the sense that they had at least 
a direct coherent relationship to political aims. They were seen as means 
of &r&g people directly into doing things an enemy government 
wished them to do: evacuating temtory, desisting from given objectives, 
accepting a given political authority. A distinction was still generay 
drawn, furthermore, prior to World War I at least, between the armed 
forces and the civilian population of a hostile country. Efforts were made 
to see that military action was directed only against those who them- 
selves had weapons in their hands and ofIered resistance. The law of war 
did not yet permit the punishment of whole peoples as a means of black- 
mail against governments. 
In all of these respects, the atom offends. So do all the other weapons 
of mass destruction. So, for that matter, did the conventional bomber of 
World War I1 when it was used for area bombing. In taking responsibil- 
ity for such things as the bombing of Dresden and Hamburg, to say 
nothing of Nagasaki and Hiroshima, Americans went beyond what it 
seems to me the dictates of Christian conscience should have allowed 
(which is not to say that I think their problem was an easy one). 
I regret, as an American and as a Christian, that these things were 
done. I think it should be our aim to do nothing of the sort in any future 
military encounter. If we must defend our homes, let us defend them 
as well as we can in the direct sense, but let us have no part in making 
millions of women and children and noncombatants hostages for the be- 
havior of their own govemments. 
It will be said to me: This means defeat. To this I can only reply: I 
am skeptical of the meaning of "victory" and "defeat" in their relation 
to modem war between great countries. To my mind the defeat is war 
itself. In any case it seems to me that there are times when we have no 
choice but to follow the dictates of our conscience, to throw ourselves on 
Gud's mercy, and not to ask too many questions. 
But this is not the only moral connotation of the atom. There is another 
in the great controversy that has raged over the question of atomic test- 
ing, its effect on the atmosphere, and its consequences for human health. 
My colleagues in the scientific field advise me to stay away from this 
subject. They point out that there is a great deal about it which is not 
yet known; that scientists are themselves in wide disagreement about its 
seriousness; that I, as a scientific layman, would not even be able to 
understand the terms in which it is put. All this I readily concede; but 
even the little that is known to the general public is enough to pose a 
problem of Christian conscience. 
Let us take a random sampling of recent press reports. During the first 
eight months of 1958, we are told, the fall-out of radioactive strontium 
on New York City increased by 25 per cent. Readings in Los Angeles 
are said by the health department of that city to have revealed for lim- 
ited periods a count of five hundred to one thousand times the normal 
radioactivity in the atmosphere and double the intensity considered safe 
for continuous exposure over a lifetime. Only a few weeks ago observa- 
tions in Sweden showed radioactivity at ten kilometers above sea level 
to be five times as intense as it was earlier in the year, and individual 
particles were detected (apparently at ground level), "larger and thought 
to be more radioactive, than any yet reported except from the immediate 
area of a test explosion." A similar report has come from B r a d  
All this is only the beginning; a large part of the fa-out from the tests 
conducted thus far is, we are told, still in the higher atmosphere and 
will not descend for years. Furthermore, the effect of radioactive sub- 
stances on human health is cumulative, so that any unnatural exposure 
presumably reduces the tolerance of exposure from natural causes or 
for medical purposes. 
In the face of these facts, I listen with some amazement to the state- 
ments with which some of the scientists endeavor to reassure us about 
such developments. The damages, they say, have been "negligible" so far. ' 
Not mcmy deaths, they say, can be expected to ensue from this increase 
in radioactivity wmpared with those which occur from natural causes. 
One scientist, pained and astounded at the concern about the radioactive 
particles in Sweden, explained that if, for example, 100 people would 
be killed by the effects of a normal atomic explosion, then only 102 could 
be expected to die from the effects of the increased radioactivity which 
Sweden has been experiencing. 
But whoever gave us the right, as Christians, to take even one inno- 
cent human life, much less 102 or a 102,0007 I recall no quantitative 
stipulation in the Sixth Commandment. God did not say through Moses 
that to take 102,000 lives was wicked but 102 was all right. I fail to see 
how any of this can be reconciled with the Christian conscience. 
I am delighted that our government now shows a serious readiness to 
work toward the termination of these experiments with atomic explosiva. 
We must go farther and work toward the elimination of the use of atomic 
weapons in war as well. This cannot be done in a day, and not all that 
needs to be done can be done by us. But we can at least make a beginning 
by endeavoring to free ourselves from our unwise dependence on atomic 
weapons in our own military calculations, from our fateful commitment 
to the first use of these weapons, whether or not they are used against us. 
There is a principle involved here which has applcation beyond just 
the field of weapons, to a number of other effects in the introduction of 
modern technology. We of this generation are only the custodians, not 
the owners, of the earth on which we live. There were others who lived 
here before, and we hope there v d  be others who are going to live here 
afterward. We have an obligation to past generations and to future ones, 
no less solemn than our obligations to ourselves. I fail to see that we 
are in any way justified in making, for the safety or convenience of OW 
own generation, alterations in our natural enkonment which may im- 
portantly change the conditions of life for those who come afterward. 
The moral laws which we acknowledge predicate the existence of a 
certain sort of world-a certain sort of natural environment-in which 
people live. This setting presumably reflects God's purpose. We did not 
create it; we do not have the right to destroy it. We know the problems 
which this environment poses for man. We know the nature of the 
Christian effort to find answers to them. We live by this lore. When we 
permit this environment to be altered quite basically by things we do 
today, we are taking upon ourselves a responsibility for which I find no 
authority in the Christian faith. 
Obviously, we do not know what the ultimate effects will be of the 
atomic weapons tests we have already conducted. I am not sure that we 
h o w  what will be the ultimate effects of our methods of disposal of 
radioactive wastes. I doubt that we know what we are doing to the 
sea through the use of modern detergents and the fouling of its surface !I 
with oil. I am not sure that we know what we are doing with modem, 
insecticides, which we employ quite recklessly in agriculture for our . '  
immediate purposes, giving little thought to their ultimate effects. We 
who call ourselves Christians must acknowledge responsibility in these 
matters, most of which are international in their implications. 
We will unavoidably find in the motives and workings of the political 
process much that is ambiguous in the Christian sense. In approaching the 
individual wdlicts between governments which make up so much of 
international relations, we must beware of pouring Christian enthusiasm 
into unsuitable vessels which were at best designed to contain the earthy 
calculations of the practical politicians. But there are phases of the gov- 
ernment's work into which we can look for Christian meaning. We can, 
look for it, first of all, in the methods of our diplomacy, where decency 
and humanity of spirit can never fail to serve the Christian cause. 
Beyond that there loom the truly apocalyptic dangers of our time, the 
ones that threaten to put an end to the very continuity of history out- 
side which we would have no identity, no face, either in civilization, in 
culture, or in morals. These dangers represent for us not only political 
questions but stupendous moral problems, to which we cannot deny the 
courageous Christian answer. Here our main concern must be to see that 
man, whose own folly once drove him from the Garden of Eden, does 
not now commit the blasphemous act of destroying, whether in fear or 
in anger or in greed, the great and lovely world in which, even in his 
fallen state, he has been permitted by the grace of God to live. 
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